

JPRS-TAC-86-069

28 AUGUST 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG PAPER SAYS SDI DOES NOT MEET SET GOALS FOR IT

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 8 July 86 p 1

[Editorial by Fritz Ullrich Fack: "Vision and Reality"]

[Text] It was a great vision that moved President Reagan 3 years ago to start what is known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the defense against hostile weapons in space itself: no longer were human beings to be annihilated in the nuclear exchange of strike and counterstrike, but the death-dealing rockets. The United States, later perhaps Europe as well, were to be invulnerable from a nuclear standpoint.

If an interim balance of these plans is drawn up today, the result is sobering. It will neither be possible to protect the major population centers of the United States, nor will the United States be in a position in the foreseeable future to station a defense system in space that will fulfil the ambitious expectations of its president.

What is involved here is not only the series of reversals that US space travel had had to endure this year and which have set SDI back by years: the Challenger disaster of 28 January, the explosion of one of the powerful Titan rockets in April and the destruction of a Delta rocket shortly after takeoff on 3 May. It is not only functional space vehicles that are lacking; more significant is the recognition that the most ambitious goal of SDI, the destruction of hostile rockets during the liftoff stage over enemy territory, does not seem to be attainable.

This goal could only have been attained with weapons stationed in space in such numbers and with such a great expenditure of technology and energy that--according to official estimates--a continuous military space program lasting more than half a century, with at least 24 shuttle flights per year (in addition to payload rockets), would have been needed.

Those in positions of responsibility are still emanating an air of (muted) optimism; but behind the scenes adjustments have been made to what is feasible: the SDI program has shrunk to the ground-based defense against incoming rockets in their terminal phase ("terminal phase defense"). Plans for space, except for the construction of killer satellites, have been abandoned de facto, because of the enormous technical difficulties and the incalculable costs. The defense committees of both Houses of Congress have drawn the inevitable conclusion and recommended cutting funds for SDI.

This has far-reaching consequences for the concept of "Fortress America." It will not be possible to defend major population centers effectively against attacking enemy rockets. Assuming that the appropriate successes in research can be achieved, only specific, narrowly circumscribed areas, such as missile silos, control centers or important military installations could be defended. Terminal phase defense also shifts the risk of destruction from hit and falling rockets from enemy territory to the proximity of one's own territory. One of the principal military objectives of the SDI program, bringing down enemy rockets over hostile territory and thus delivering a doubly destructive strike on the aggressor, becomes redundant.

The United States remains vulnerable, is possibly even more vulnerable than ever today. While the Soviet Union stations one medium-range rocket and one mobile ICBM after another, the future developments of the United States for an effective second strike with modern ICBM's are still on the drawing board. The backbone of the American strategic missile force is still made up of the Minuteman rocket, which is slowly reaching 20 years of age. There is no new, and above all, no mobile version of an ICBM which would be operational. All efforts have been directed towards the SDI project, the value of which may not be entirely convincing to the next president.

Even a man like Henry Kissinger supported the SDI project, using the argument that it was the only "alternative to dependence on nuclear weapons." It could also be used as a bargaining tool, as long it was only in the research stage, to force the other side to reduce the number of its offensive weapons. In the interim, President Reagan seems to be subscribing to this logic. He is letting it be known that he is ready to negotiate with the Russians--if not about research, then at least about stationing defensive weapons in space.

It is certainly a success of SDI not to be dismissed that the Soviets responded in Geneva with offers to reduce their offensive weapons. But even if the Russians have a healthy respect for the technical capabilities of the Americans and are therefore holding out concessions, they are not blind. They can see, of course, that the bargaining value of the SDI program is no longer the same as it was at the beginning of the undertaking, given the technical and financial difficulties and resistance in Congress.

The United States has neglected the concept of the "assured second strike" in recent years, on occasion even abandoned it, in favor of the vision of SDI. It wanted to get away from the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction;" for admirable reasons. But it has not made the world safer. On the contrary: the strategic balance between the two superpowers has shifted in recent years in favor of the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 5200/2725

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN SDI 'VIRTUALLY CONFIRMED'

Gotoda Says Announcement Coming

OW071221 Tokyo KYODO in English 1210 GMT 7 Aug 86

[Text] Karuizawa, Nagano Pref., Aug 7 KYODO -- Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda said Thursday that the government is expected to make a formal decision on Japan's participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) within this month. Gotoda told a seminar sponsored by the Japan Committee for Economic Development that the government will reach a conclusion on Japan's participation in the research phase of the space-based antimissile system, or "star wars" project, this month, or in early September at the latest. Gotoda suggested Japan's participation is similar to the "West German formula."

Private enterprises will take part in the research, but the government will not fund their participation while ensuring the return to Japan of technology developed by the Japanese in the course of the research. Key cabinet ministers "virtually confirmed" Japan's eventual participation in the SDI research on the basis of the "West German formula" at their third meeting on July 18, political sources said. The fourth meeting will be held Friday.

Nakasone Says No Decision Yet

OW080241 Tokyo KYODO in English 0225 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Text] Tokyo, Aug 8 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said Friday Japan has not reached a final conclusion on whether or not it will take part in research for U.S. President Ronald Reagan's "star wars" space-based antimissile project. "Studies and research are being made (concerning Japan's participation) but we have not arrived at a conclusion," Nakasone told reporters. He referred to a statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda Thursday that he wants to see a final decision on the controversial defense project, officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), by early September.

Gotoda said he foresees a "positive" conclusion.

Nakasone said, "I don't know," in response to a question on when a final decision will be made.

Reagan has invited Japan and several other U.S. allies to take part in the research phase of the project. A governmental mission has recommended that Japan join the United States in pushing the project.

JPRS-TAC-86-069
28 August 1986

PRC: RENMIN RIBAO COMMENTARY ON EUREKA PROGRAM

HK100412 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 6 Aug 86 p 7

["Special Commentary" by Zhang Baoxiang: "Birth and Development of the 'Eureka' Program" -- boldface as published]

[Excerpts] AFTER A YEAR'S PREPARATION, WEST EUROPE HAS MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN THE "EUREKA" PROGRAM. THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING HAVE INCREASED TO 19, AND IT HAS MADE DECISIONS ON 72 COOPERATIVE PROJECTS. THIS IS AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM, WHICH AIMS AT KEEPING PACE WITH THE U.S. AND JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY WITHIN THE NEXT 5 TO 10 YEARS. THE "EUREKA" PROGRAM HAS ATTRACTED THE WORLD'S CLOSE ATTENTION, AND IT WILL INFLUENCE EUROPEAN-U.S. RELATIONS, EUROPEAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS.

The "Eureka" program is already 1 year old. Over the past year, the program has made remarkable progress: Three meetings of ministers were held; the number of participating countries has increased from 17 to 19; and 72 cooperative projects were adopted. Further decisions on the source of capital were made. Also, a 7-member secretariat was established. Therefore, it can be said that the "Eureka" program has been "successfully started" after a year's preparation.

First, the Proposal of the "Eureka" Program

[Passage omitted] Just before the West European countries energetically discussed the issue of scientific and technological cooperation, the United States proposed its "star wars" program, which braced up West Europe, made it become united, and acted as a catalyst for scientific and technological cooperation in West Europe. Also, the arms race between the United States and Soviet Union, which focuses on the "star wars" program, has brought new and complicated factors to the defense system of West Europe. In terms of scientific and technological cooperation, it was an alarm for the suspicious West European countries: A backward situation of science and technology will not only affect economic development but will also cause one's political and national defense decisions to be influenced by others. In order to safeguard the independence and safety of West Europe, it is an urgent task that the countries should promptly turn the program under discussion into reality. With the great support of Mitterrand, the president of France, representatives of 17 West European countries and the European Community held their first meeting in Paris on 18 July, at which they declared the formal birth of the "Eureka" program.

Second, Favorable Factors and Difficulties in Implementing the "Eureka" Program

The Eureka program is an ambitious one. The short-term objective of the program is to promote close contacts among the European industrialists, to strengthen cooperation between enterprises and research institutes, to strive to develop new products for civilian use within the next 5 to 10 years by using high technology, and to strengthen the competitiveness of West Europe. Then, on this basis, it will strive to form a "European technology community," so as to establish equal partner relations with the United States and Japan, to make Europe "become a continent entering the 21st century," and to maintain Europe's status of being "a big country" in the world's economy.

The mark of the "Eureka" program's success should be the marketable products jointly made by various countries, as well as the establishment of a really unified market which has no national boundaries but involves all of West Europe. To achieve this, however, there is a very complicated obstacle, that is the issue of standards, which has yet to be removed. At present, industrialists of various countries are tackling the issues concerning the establishment of a product market in which specifications, models and standards are made uniform.

There are many worrying factors in addition to the difficulties concerning capital and technological standards. For example, the U.S. "star wars" program will involve \$26 billion, which is much more than that of the "Eureka" program and has attracted many European enterprises and technological personnel. Many enterprises have taken part in both programs. However, will the "Eureka" program be run parallel with the "star wars" program or become the additional civilian part of the "star wars" program? This is an issue which West Europe has been much concerned about right from the start.

Also, the relations between the "Eureka" program and the European Economic Community have not been clarified. How to coordinate those research projects which are duplicated in the "Eureka" program and the "European Information Study and Strategic Development Plan" is also another problem. Therefore, the "Eureka" program still has to go through a long and winding road before reaching the stage of full-scale implementation, though the program has made a good start.

Third, the Major Motive Force for Promoting Unity in West Europe

The world is moving toward times of high technology. In the future, to a certain extent, the strength of a country and the international competition will be based upon technological strength. Therefore, the "Eureka" program will exert a major influence on Europe's future and the world's politics. Though the "Eureka" program is for civilian use, its achievements could be applied to the military area. This will thus help West Europe strengthen its national defense strength and cooperation. This program has attracted close attention from the world. Many countries have said that they wanted to join the "Eureka" program. Thus, it will not be difficult in seeing that the program will influence European-U.S. relations, Europe-Soviet Union relations, East-West relations and North-South relations. It is also very obvious that this program helps promote a united West Europe. The 19 participating countries belong to two economic groups in West Europe. The 19 participating countries belong to two economic groups in West Europe: the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association. The "Eureka" program has strengthened the contacts of these two competitive groups. This may symbolize a breakthrough in the pattern and area of unity in West Europe.

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CSO: 5200/4063

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA SEES REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 'PLAYING AT ARMS CONTROL'

PM121421 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

["International Review"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpt] Two Approaches

As the poet once said: "There are years I would not welcome back." Yes, in the history of mankind there are dates which are engraved on the hearts of generations of human beings. The last 7 days have passed beneath the banner of the 41st anniversary of the barbaric U.S. atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The week of international solidarity with the victims of the bombings began on 6 August and turned into a striking demonstration of the strength and scale of the antiwar movement on all the continents of the world. Millions of people of different political views, religions, and social affiliations came together beneath a single banner: "No more Hiroshimas. Yes to peace and disarmament!" It is a feature of the current situation that, as a result of the new Soviet peace initiatives and major compromise proposals, there is now a unique opportunity to put a stop to the arms race, start the process of elimination of nuclear weapons, and seek political solutions to international conflicts and global problems; in short, to lift the threat of thermonuclear destruction from human civilization.

Today the people judge a particular government's attitude to the cardinal problems of war and peace primarily by its attitude toward the question of banning nuclear tests, because they see it as the first, decisive step toward delivering mankind from nuclear explosions, which was 41 years old on 6 August, was warmly welcomed, for example, at the second meeting of the "Delhi Six" in Mexico. The slogan "Halt Nuclear tests, follow the USSR's example" was heard everywhere at the numerous rallies on the day devoted to the memory of the victims of Hiroshima, which acquired a special symbolic significance this year.

It is the common view of observers that Washington has obviously underestimated the political impact of the Soviet Union's decision to halt all nuclear explosions and even more so of the fact that the unilateral moratorium has been extended three times. The 15-love score, contrary to the logic of sport, is not in the U.S. favor. Each of the 15 nuclear explosions at the Nevada test site as it were highlighted the U.S. Administration's obstinate persistence in pursuing a policy of nuclear madness. Ultimately the murmur of indignation among the closest U.S. allies and, above all, inside the country (among U.S. legislators as well), reached the ears of official Washington.

So?.. Maybe they have at last decided to heed the voice of reason, abandon the primitive logic of counting on force, and display a new way of thinking? Unfortunately, as yet there are no grounds for such an optimistic conclusion. It is more a matter of the administration's being compelled to maneuver, having found itself in an awkward position, and hastily trying to win public opinion over to its side. "Official administration spokesmen admit," THE NEW YORK TIMES, for example, remarks, "that Reagan is now faced with the necessity of playing at arms control." But this, according to the paper, is what these by no means goodwill games look like, particularly in relation to the banning of nuclear tests: "The White House opened its mouth, cleared its throat, and explained: We are prepared to discuss limiting underground nuclear weapon tests -- which has more to do with verification (proverka) than with tests -- but we will not discuss what is really important, namely a universal nuclear test ban. This is totally out of the question because more and more nuclear explosions are needed for our 'nonnuclear' umbrella in the context of SDI." No comment, as one says in such cases.

In the White House political "kitchen" they have generated such a propaganda fog that even experienced U.S. observers cannot always discern the real state of affairs. It could be said that a nationwide discussion has recently been launched in the U.S. press of White House policy on key issues of disarmament and Washington's stance in connection with the latest Soviet initiatives.

It all began with an article by Leslie Gelb in THE NEW YORK TIMES. This well-known specialist, who writes on arms control problems, had apparently had a stroke of luck. A "leak" from the White House "kitchen" had been specially arranged for him concerning the nature of R. Reagan's letter in reply to the new Soviet initiatives. Gelb had in his possession top-secret material bearing the "eyes only" inscription (this is the usual inscription on top-secret U.S. documents) and intended for the most select members of the Washington hierarchy. But it turns out that it was not the actual letter but an interpretation of it -- to put it mildly, an extremely tendentious one at that -- of benefit only to the organizers of the "leak."

It was in that form that it appeared in the newspaper. Gelb's conclusions regarding the administration's readiness for "serious talks," "compromise," and so forth were sensational and were extolled by official propaganda. But when (inscrutable are the channels of Washington "leaks") the president's specific stance became known, a real scandal broke out. According to most observers, there were no "new ideas," but a hardening of the line on plans for the development of the "star wars" program and a direct attack on the ABM Treaty. "Reagan's reply to the reasonable compromise," the Californian paper MERCURY NEWS stresses, "is causing indignation. To treat arms control with the seriousness displayed in this letter is to make a mockery of it."

As many authoritative U.S. specialists are now writing, the president has adopted an extremely negative stance on the SDI issue. Having "agreed" not to deploy this program for 5-7 years (indeed, it is technically impossible to deploy it earlier), he then proposes switching to a "broader," "new" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and that means rejecting the ban on testing and deploying ABM systems. "Washington's new interpretation of the treaty on limiting ABM systems," E. Lewis claims in THE NEW YORK TIMES, "in effect puts an end to its existence. It paves the way for the administration to cast aside the legal objections to its 'star wars' program."

Here is yet another view of the "Reagan letter." The MERCURY NEWS is very blunt. "We hope this letter will end up in the trash can. The treaty on limiting ABM systems is a good treaty which deserves to be strengthened, not weakened, and certainly not on the sly."

Other "tasty" facts are coming out. Apparently, the U.S. allies, during the "consultations," were misinformed that the White House was sticking to the "limited," that is, the old interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (So much for Washington's "sincerity") But misinforming the allies is not that serious. However, what about misleading its own seniors?

That is what the administration is doing when it tries to persuade the residents of Capitol Hill that, apparently, the "Russians themselves have never deemed it necessary to ban ABM technology intended for the future." This, they say, is indicated by the "secret protocols" on the talks. If so, any systems elaborated since 1972 (the date the treaty was signed) fall outside the ABM framework and are "legitimate."

The other day a well-known specialist in the field, Senator Sam Nunn, demanded that the materials be made available, since he did not trust any protocols permitting a "new" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In response the State Department said that the protocols were secret and it cited a precedent: 1795, when President Washington refused to provide Congress with the materials on the Jay Treaty. Can this be serious? the reader might well ask. Can Washington really be clinging to 18th century precedents at a time when statesmen are expected to display a new way of thinking? Alas, it is so. And this demonstrates the fundamental difference in approach to very important present-day problems between the USSR and the United States.

Our country is putting forward an integrated program of actions and interrelated measures. It concerns the chief problem of the day -- the survival of the whole of mankind. Whole, not divided into continents -- Asia, Europe, and so forth. It is this approach that demonstrates the very quintessence of the concept of an all-embracing system of international security. The package of proposals contained in M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech concerning peace, security, and fruitful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific is an integral part of it. This comprehensive approach has also attracted the attention of the world press, which is continuing to comment on the results of the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary's stay in the Far East. The Hungarian paper MAGYAR HIRLAP writes, in particular: "The proposals made in Vladivostok and backed up by specific Soviet steps are geared not only to strengthening peace in that part of the world, but also to creating a general security system."

It is against this background that the propaganda ballyhoo in the U.S. Administration over the question of banning nuclear tests, the ABM Treaty, and treaties on limiting and reducing offensive armaments is particularly unseemly. Today we must not destroy the old bridges. There are so few of them. The time has come to build new ones in order to halt mankind's slide toward a worldwide catastrophe. Washington must finally realize that to turn Soviet-American dialogue into an umbrella beneath which the U.S. military-industrial complex and reactionary forces can add more fuel to the insane arms race and spread it to space is to betray the people's hopes and undermine their faith in a peaceful future. Our country will not participate in such a "dialogue." There is another way -- the way of partnership and mobilization of common sense and reason. We are always ready for a dialogue of that kind. And we intend, as the Soviet leadership has repeatedly stressed, to do all we can to bring about its success.

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CSO: 5200/1512

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: NST ISSUES, REAGAN LETTER, MOSCOW TALKS

OW100935 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0532 GMT 10 Aug 86

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer]

[Text] Hello comrades, we are meeting you in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center to discuss topical problems in world politics. Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer, are taking part in our discussion today. We will devote our discussion today to somewhat unusual events now taking place in the U.S. capital.

Generally, at this time of year, during the hot summer, there is a political lull in the U.S. capital. However, events are now occurring there which I would call unusual, and even extraordinary. They are connected with the letter U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent to Moscow to the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary. You know that at the end of June, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev sent Reagan a letter containing very important new Soviet proposals concerning the problem of disarmament and dealing with Soviet-U.S. relations.

Washington's reaction to this letter was not a traditional one. There was no outright rejection of the letter's contents, and the President said that it was a matter of very important and serious proposals made by the Soviet Union. Then, Washington spent more than a month preparing a reply to Mikhail Sergeyevich's letter. At the end of July, the White House sent a letter to Moscow. According to existing protocol and existing traditions, this kind of correspondence between state leaders is generally of a confidential nature and is not intended for wide discussion in the press. Nevertheless, this time Washington patently and crudely violated this unwritten law, this principle, and violated its confidentiality. The U.S. press started, fairly widely, to discuss Reagan's letter. Besides, there was a patent leak, as it is called in the United States, of information. Political journalists and press organizations received certain reports from appropriately informed circles. Wide discussion of the letter's contents, and interpretations of the President's reply, and so forth, followed.

It is known that the Soviet Union has not yet replied to Reagan's letter. Mikhail Sergeyevich, speaking in Vladivostok, said that this document is being studied. Meanwhile, there is this propaganda ballyhoo going on in the United States. I think that these circumstances free our hands to some extent; and since we are not officials, not occupying official posts in the state apparatus, I think we are justified in using what we know from reports...

[Bovin interrupts] All the more so since there are also rumors in Moscow, not only in Washington.

[Zorin] Yes, and using what we have learned from reports in the U.S. press and from what is being discussed in Moscow we will deal today with this topic. Before we discuss this matter, I would like to ask you, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, these questions: What is the matter? Why has there been a violation of the usual rules? Why has there been a leak? What is behind all this your view?

[Bovin] First of all, Valentin Sergeyevich, I would not emphasize the violation of rules because you know perfectly well that they keep nothing secret there and they always organize all kinds of leaks.

[Zorin interrupts] Often, but not always. When needed, they know how to keep silent.

[Bovin] Yes, but this is a special case by the nature of the importance of the topic itself. The United States is now in a fairly difficult position because lately -- and our viewers know this -- there have been systematic peace initiatives by the Soviet Union, the extended moratorium, goodwill gestures, and a whole series of proposals. All this has placed the White House in a difficult position because, by saying no every time, and then no again, and no again, it has produced a negative reaction in the world public opinion and also in the United States. And now, Reagan's letter on the essence of the matter and this campaign around this letter I would say are an attempt to intensify political maneuvering and generally seize the initiative. This is actually what the aim is. to seize the initiative and calm Americans by using an optimistic tone. The letter has been written, everything is normal, everything is okay, it meets the Russians' wishes, and opens the door for a summit meeting, so everything is normal. As Reagan said: The ball is now in the Soviet court and it is Moscow's turn to reply.

And that is all. So the essence of the matter is to seize the initiative and say: We have done our work and now it is the Russians' turn. I think that this is the purport of all the talk going on there.

[Zorin] The U.S. press presents the contents of Reagan's letter to Moscow as very important and as opening new roads in the Soviet-U.S. talks. Vitaliy Vladimirovich what could you say on this subject and what is the essence of the U.S. position, on the basis of what has been published in the U.S. press in particular, and what we know?

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, I would begin by saying that it is necessary to try to examine this position very carefully, without any preconceived ideas. If there are elements of logic in it, on no account should they be overlooked. It should be approached in a very objective manner since the matter is of exceptional importance. Most probably, it is best, when speaking about the U.S. position, to compare it on a purely factual basis with the Soviet position, the way it appears, the way it is today.

The key issue is preventing the arms race in space, and, if we talk about the United States, it is the SDI issue, the fate of SDI.

The Soviet position, which has been fairly accurately outlined to the United States, is as follows: not abandoning the ABM treaty, the timeless treaty which was signed in 1972, for a 15-year period. What does Reagan offer: not abandoning this treaty over a period of 7 to 7 and 1/2 years and carrying out not only research but also experimental design work and even testing space weapons. He proposes that at the end of this period the sides begin talks on how they will deploy space arms, how they will conduct the militarization of space.

With respect to strategic arms, strategic intercontinental arms, the Soviet Union has taken very major steps. We have proposed an interim solution of this problem, an interim decision which would cover three classes of existing strategic arms -- intercontinental, submarine-based, and heavy bomber-based ballistic missiles.

Insofar as Soviet-U.S. talks are concerned, the counting generally begins at the figure which was fixed, in its time, in the SALT II treaty, which is 2,400 vehicles. The Soviet Union has proposed in the interim, a solution as a first step, to reduce, by approximately one-third, the number of vehicles and the number of warheads. Speaking in concrete terms this means 1,600 vehicles and 8,000 warheads. We are talking about a comprehensive solution which would leave no loopholes.

In the field of intermediate range weapons, the Soviet Union has taken an important compromise step. It proposed to take these weapons out of categories and to discuss them separately.

What does Reagan offer? On the basis of all these leaks and the information at our disposal, he offered to reduce arms by half, but actually just one class, or more precisely, two classes -- warheads on land-based and sea-based missiles. That is all.

The third and most important element of this entire system are intermediate-range weapons and primarily intermediate-range missiles. Here too, the Soviet Union has taken a step forward. The Soviet Union in Geneva openly proposed a draft agreement with the United States on the elimination, destruction, and dismantling of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe; on freezing the level of Soviet missiles -- in Asia.

There have been major arguments about the British and French missile forces. The USSR has offered to take them out of negotiations, provided the British and French forces remain at their present level.

What does Reagan offer? Here Reagan has essentially simply repeated the U.S. position which has been outlined many times: The so-called U.S. zero option which has been made repeatedly, or the interim decision, the core of which is that a certain number of U.S. missiles as many as possible, remains in Europe.

[Zorin] When the U.S. press outlines the President's position, it does so mostly with question marks.

Let us examine the essence of these proposals without any emotion, calmly and objectively. Let us begin with the important problem of the ABM treaty, please, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich.

[Bovin] Well, without emotions -- generally the Americans have a lot of emotions, and there is one emotion here. They say that Reagan's letter contains a fundamentally new approach. In the past, Reagan generally said that SDI was not a subject for discussion, and now, for the first time, the President has agreed to discuss some aspects of his very own "star wars" program.

[Zorin interrupts] On the surface this is effective.

[Bovin] Yes, and in fact, people in the United States even more right-wing, even more conservative than Reagan are literally sounding the alarm and clamoring about what is going on, that Reagan is retreating from his positions, that liberals of some sort have convinced him, you see, and that the United States is being disarmed, so to speak, in the face of the Russians. This is the sort of clamor you hear.

[Zorin] But in actual fact?

[Bovin] In actual fact, of course, there is no basis for this clamor because, well, just look at what Reagan proposes. Now we have told the United States, as we have noted already, let us adhere to the ABM treaty for 15-20 years and refrain from deploying these systems. Reagan says, good, for 5 years we agree not to deploy these space-based defense systems.

But what is 5 years? Even if he said nothing and proposed nothing, according to their own plans, deployment of these space ABM systems can begin somewhere in the middle of the nineties, at the earliest. They give themselves 10 years. Yet Reagan proposes 5 years. Very well, we will not deploy them for 5 years, he says, and then we will hold talks with you for 2 years. Talks about what? Talks about how to gradually move into a new era, an era oriented towards defense systems. In other words, talks about how to deploy these systems in space. And if we fail to reach any agreement during these 2 years then either of the two sides will have the right to begin deploying these systems after giving the other side 6-months notice.

This is Reagan's logic. Now generally I think, comrades, that you all understand, in fact, that Reagan demands that we sanction ourselves, and that we sign an agreement with him permitting U.S. deployment of these systems. But this is a matter of principle. In fact, this is what we are struggling against. Yet he proposes that we change our position 180 degrees, and contrary to our position, recognize the necessity of these systems. This, strictly speaking, is the first element of Reagan's position, if we speak objectively, and what it means in essence is...

[Zhurkin, interrupts] But to this...

[Bovin] A complete surrender by the Soviet Union, a retreat from our positions and adoption of U.S. positions. That is all.

[Zhurkin] To this can be added other positions, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, that must also be calmly reviewed. They propose not only that laboratory research be carried out, but that experimental designs and tests be legalized.

[Bovin] Field tests, not bench tests.

[Zhurkin] Yes, field tests, normal field tests. Now this is a revision of the ABM Treaty. How can preservation of the ABM Treaty be discussed when Article 5 simply prohibits this.

Now, very briefly, I would like to say something about another element of the U.S. position. It proposes the establishment of a regime which will not deploy mass destruction weapons in space as something new.

[Bovin] There is a treaty on this topic.

[Zhurkin] There is a treaty. I especially brought a text of this treaty which was signed. [changes thought] The 20th anniversary of its signing will be marked next January, and it says -- it was also signed by the United States -- that the signatory states of the treaty will not launch or deploy weapons of mass destruction in space. Talk should now concentrate on not launching any weapons into space that could operate against the earth from space. This is understandable.

Obviously another maneuver is set down in Reagan's response...

[Bovin, interrupts] They are continuing to stick to their line, that is the essence of the matter. Instead of seeking a compromise and taking stock they are pursuing their line.

[Zhurkin] Yes, they stick to their line.

[Zorin] Generally the impression is created that we are talking about a trick. They talk about 5 years for the ABM Treaty while the head of the U.S. program says that they will not be ready for at least 9-10 years. So it simply appears that this 5 years is a fairly unseemly trick.

Another key issue in Soviet-U.S. talks is the question of strategic arms. Now if we proceed from the information that we have, which has come into our hands, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, is there anything new in this issue, in the proposals contained in Reagan's letter?

[Bovin] You know, one must take into consideration that the U.S. position has now changed fundamentally. If previously, it remained within the framework of the restrictions stipulated by SALT I and SALT II, grudgingly maybe, in May, Reagan practically wiped this whole matter out by saying that the administration would not be guided by these restrictions, and proposed to substitute the existing regime by... [changes thought] They had various formulas: for example, they called it a substitute regime [rezhim zamenitel] or called it a new arms control structure, or even used the term interim framework for genuine mutual restraint, instead of this regime.

Now what does this mean? How do they picture this restraint? They say, good, we will develop our armed forces but we will not have more warheads than you have on strategic missiles. This is our restraint. Very well, some 15 years ago this really would have meant restraint on their part, but now, when there are cruise missiles, say, on heavy bombers -- and they are arming their aircraft, their machines with cruise missiles in the most active way -- and when there are sea-based long-range missiles, to simply limit one's restraint to strategic missiles is just impossible. There is no reciprocity.

No matter where you turn when you review the letter, even in the most objective way, their position is essentially the same -- agreement on their terms. Of course, now you say it is a trick. But from Reagan's point of view it is not a trick. He is defending the interests of the United States as he understands them, completely forgetting that, insofar as some kind of agreement is under discussion, he should also take our interests into consideration. For some reason, the Americans forget this and here it is manifested quite well, I mean in the sphere of strategic arms.

[Zorin] Yes, but from the point of view of bilateral relations this really does look like a trick.

[Zhurkin] It looks like a trick for another reason too. If we were to summarize what Reagan omits from the proposal on strategic arms, we would see omitted all those forces in which the United States has forged further ahead.

[Bovin] Yes, the cruise missiles.

[Zhurkin] Take the cruise missiles. They began deploying them first.

They have deployed somewhere in the vicinity of 1,500 to 2,000 of them according to various sources. Now take bombers. Their effectiveness increases sharply when armed with cruise missiles; they want to omit them and leave.

[Zorin interrupts] We are talking about...

[Zhurkin interrupts] and leave a loop hole to continue the arms race.

[Zorin] We are talking about our side limiting what we have more of while they retain what they have more of.

[Zhurkin] Yes, retain what they have more of.

[Zorin] We have assessed our point of view on these proposals. The official position has not been announced yet, but we have expressed our opinion. Now I would like to dwell on another aspect related to President Reagan's letter which is presently the cause of so much clamour.

The U.S. press believes this letter was a kind of compromise between various opposing Washington groups. There are doves and there are hawks there. When Comrade Gorbachev's letter was received, the hawks insisted that everything be rejected outright. The doves suggested it be viewed seriously. Reagan's response is a compromise between the two opposing Washington opinions. Vitaliy Vladimirovich, does this appear to be true?

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, that is how it appears to me. I think that in dealing with the Reagan administration we are not dealing with a monolith but with an administration in which there is a struggle between various trends. This struggle may not be as simple as it is described by the U.S. press. They make everything appear quite simple. Shultz is on the left, Weinberger is on the right; Shultz supports a constructive course of developments, Weinberger supports a negative one.

Not everything is so simple, because we are talking about a struggle between various forces, although the entire complex is positioned to the right. But the one and the other understand that ultimately it could be curtains for all [v sluchaye chego pokhorony stanut vseobshchimi]. From this they conclude that relations must be put in order somehow, they must be regulated, gaining the utmost advantage for themselves, while others continue to build hopes of achieving supremacy.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, excuse me, but I will probably disagree with you on some things. It seems to me that the differences in the administration between Weinberger and Shultz, are being grossly exaggerated. I think that there is a great element of political play in this, a game calculated at deceiving the world, and

primarily U.S. public opinion. Of course, there are different opinions between different people in the administration, but on basic issues they, nevertheless, occupy a fairly monolithic position.

The main thing in this is that the decisive role is not played by various advisers who come to Reagan with their advice, but is played by the President himself. Of course, one must say that presently the Presidency is at an odd point. Nearly 6 years of Reagan's term have passed and little more than 2 years remain. In U.S. political jargon this is termed lame duck. When the President's term is drawing to a conclusion and politicians are looking to see who the next boss will be, the President's influence is considered to be waning.

However, an extremely curious thing is happening now. You know that the question of nominating Reagan for election to a third term is now being discussed. A corresponding bill has even been submitted to Congress. This is a very complex matter. The 22d Amendment to the Constitution must be repealed and I personally think that this is simply unrealizable. To repeal a constitutional amendment, or to adopt one, for that matter, is an extremely cumbersome procedure, requiring a long period of time, and the 2-odd years remaining for Reagan will not be enough.

Why, then, have they done this? Now this relates precisely to what we have been talking about -- to avoid making Reagan a lame duck, to strengthen his political influence, and to exert a political and psychological pressure on the elite. In other words, do not think that Reagan is on the way out. It is possible he will be elected for the third time. Hence his influence is bolstered. Either way, one way or the other, it remains a fact that despite some controversy in Washington, decisions there and their implementation continue to remain in the White House, in the hands of the President.

[Zhurkin] Well! Valentin Sergeyevich, let us register our differences then, so to speak, because...

[Bovin, interrupts] I wanted to support you [tebya] in this case. [gestures toward Zhurkin]

[Zhurkin] Yes.

[Bovin] I cannot agree that this is a political game. I think it is very serious and it is not only a matter of differences within the Reagan administration, I look more deeply. If you take the U.S. ruling class now and not just the administration, you find, in the ruling class, various U.S. bourgeoisie and U.S. ruling groups with different political positions.

[Zorin, interrupts] Here I agree with you, that is correct.

[Bovin] And that is reflected to a certain extent by actions in the systems.

[Zorin, interrupts] And the extent to which it is reflected in the system is a debatable question.

[Bovin] It may be so. Look at the Congress for instance: You cannot say that it is no longer subordinate to the White House, but clearly it takes a different position with respect to the Republic of South Africa, the position on nuclear testing, the position of defense spending. Generally, congressmen oppose the White House's position on very

important and fundamental issues. And I do not know what will happen after the elections that will be held this year. They may intensify precisely these accents. These differences occurring in the broader social strata of the ruling elite are reflected in White House policy. Of course, Reagan is maneuvering: He has to take into consideration this and that and the other...

[Zhurkin, interrupts] And the game, there are also elements of the game.

[Bovin] There are, of course. But the game is not the main thing in politics, it is just an arrangement. And he must take all this into consideration. And indeed this letter does that probably... [changes thought] Judging from the rumors going around, some things were excluded from it, somebody objected, somebody argued, something was excluded. It is not in vain that they were engaged with this matter for a whole month.

[Zhurkin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, the letter can also be the result of compromise but the result is not a good quality one, the result turned out substandard [brakvannyi].

[Bovin] That is another matter. If you wish I can even defend the Americans, in a way, because they are in a special situation. In addition to holding talks with us, they are also holding talks among themselves, and also [words indistinct]...

[Khurkin, interrupts] [Words indistinct] talks

[Bovin] Yes, and in this respect...

[Zorin, interrupts] And the factor of the allies.

[Bovin] Yes, and the allies too. They cannot overlook the position of the allies because the value of detente is felt much more in Europe. In Europe they are more serious about restoring detente and somehow normalizing the entire situation which has now emerged, and they put pressure on the Americans. You most probably remember, comrades, the recent "Studio 9" program in which Egon Bahr and David Owen participated. It was very obvious that their position was different from that of the Americans. And this is not some particular case. It is generally so, despite the fact that Western Europe kowtows to the United States, that is understandable. That is because of Atlantic solidarity, discipline. Yet there are other political positions and this has to be registered somehow and cannot be ignored by the White House. This is also reflected in the Americans' position.

[Zorin] In order to summarize the results of this part of our discussion I would like to say that it is indisputable that there are serious differences in the U.S. ruling class and that there are influential circles which are increasingly more concerned. It is indisputable that this is also reflected in the position of the Congress, which is confronting the administration more and more. It is indisputable that the allies are raising their voices more and more, and objecting sometimes openly and more often secretly to the Washington line. But I retain my view that as far as the administration is concerned, it is fairly monolithic and is following its line, which was particularly reflected in this letter, because even from what you two colleagues have said in characterizing the letter, no contradictions or special compromise ensue. What ensues is a firm line repeating practically most of what the Americans have said so far. And now I would like to deal with a very important issue which, possibly in the ballyhoo of the last few days, about which we are talking and because of which we were forced [vynuzhdeny] to appear today, occupies a leading place. Everything is connected with

prospects for a summit meeting, prospects outlined during the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan. Now the letter addressed by Reagan to Moscow is being interpreted as if it opens the road to this meeting, and removes obstacles that there could have been. And thus the American side has done everything to make a summit meeting possible. Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, what would you say in this connection?

[Bovin] I do not have that impression at all because what does the door mean? It means to create some conditions for solving at least a few concrete issues at this meeting. If it is a question of holding another ritual, no conditions at all are needed. They meet, talk, it is televised, there is a ceremony, and they part.

[It is an empty letter from this point of view. I may be wrong, I may be underestimating some things that I do not know. But in the U.S. newspaper "BOSTON GLOBE, a journalist wrote the following -- I just want to read it, comrades, I think it is said very correctly: Yes, President Reagan wants the summit meeting to take place. He wants to appear like a competent state leader. But the important fact which the United States must realize is that the only result Reagan wants to achieve during the summit meeting is to induce the Russians to ratify the havoc he has wreaked on the entire system of agreed military limitations.

I think that this describes very accurately the essence of the matter. Namely, Reagan wants Comrade Gorbachev to come and agree with the U.S. approach to all the fundamental positions. It is clear that this cannot happen. Hence, returning to the letter, I do not see it creating some new favorable conditions for a second summit meeting.

[Zhurkin] All the same, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, we have the eternal question. Is the glass half full or half empty? All the same, it seems to me that today's Reagan is not the 1980-81 model. Let us remember his bravado in 1980 and 1981, let us remember Reagan's arrogant attitude toward the very idea of a summit meeting. And now he is almost seeking and asking for a meeting. Of course this is not being done out of sympathy for us nor because of a thirst for peace. This is being done apparently because of political interests...

[Bovin interrupts] An interest in what?

[Zhurkin] And we must try to evaluate the intensity of these interests.

[Bovin interrupts] In what? In just prattling or in solving something? That is the problem. An interest in what: in solving concrete political problems or in just shaking Gorbachev's hand once again, but in Washington this time? That is their problem.

[Zhurkin] I think that the factors are pressuring him. I could enumerate them. But the President and the administration are opposing this pressure and are trying to deal with these factors in order to hold the meeting on their terms, to ensure their conditions. Nevertheless, the factors are pressing on, and here it is impossible to assess whether these factors will press hard enough on the Reagan administration for it to do something more constructive or not. The future will show. It is difficult to evaluate these factors today. There is a large number of very major factors. You have already said that Reagan is threatened with entering history as the first President in many years who has failed to agree with the Russians on arms limitations. This cannot fail to worry the administration however conservative its views.

The many difficulties with Congress are obvious. We have talked about that. Here is another fact: The Americans were actually promised military superiority over the Soviet Union. A trillion dollars were spent, but there is no superiority at all. And this has to be considered by the administration. For this reason, I would say, and this is my view, that there has been no strategic change in the Reagan administration. The same people and the same policy are there as before. Yet there have been small tactical turns in the administration. There is no doubt about the aspiration to use these tactical turns for its own advantage.

[Bovin] Yes, I agree that it is possible to talk about some tactical turns.

Nevertheless, what does coming to an agreement mean? Coming to agreement implies some kind of compromise; I have to give in on something, you have to give in somewhere, and together, we move forward. But in order to achieve a compromise I must learn to look at the world not only through my own eyes, but also through your eyes. And here I firmly believe that the Americans, including Reagan, have not yet managed to learn to look at the world through our eyes, in this case, and to also consider our interests. They know their own interests perfectly well. Theirs are all here and they will not abandon them. I think that they are not ready to understand and consider our interests, that is, to make this compromise, and that is the main point.

[Zorin] I would like to pick up your thought about compromise and quote an example. It has already been said that the U.S. President has declared that the United States is abandoning SALT II. They pretend that this treaty, in its time, was a big U.S. gift to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, SALT II was precisely a compromise, a compromise in which each of the sides voluntarily imposed some kind of limitations on itself. The United States imposed limitations, and the Soviet Union imposed limitations, and that is diplomacy, compromise. If the United States abandons SALT II, the compromise is violated and this creates circumstances for the Soviet Union to also remove the limitations imposed on it by this treaty. This is a double-edged weapon and shows how dangerous it is in politics to violate these compromises.

It has to be said that some people in Washington, and it is evident in military circles, understand the danger of this kind of policy in the White House. I would like to stress again that in today's discussion we have expressed our personal points of view on the situation that has arisen in connection with the campaign started by the U.S. press.

The official response to the President's letter will follow, but insofar as the U.S. press has started this noisy campaign, I think that it would be useful for us to express our personal points of view.

In concluding our discussion, I would like to ask you, colleagues, this question: How would you now, this very minute, evaluate the situation existing today?

[Bovin] Well that is very difficult. For instance, I think that if we talk specifically about the summit meeting, the issue is still open. Neither Moscow nor Washington can say whether or not there will be such a meeting. On the one hand, naturally, preparations for it are being conducted. A visit by Comrade Shevardnadze to Washington has been set. A large team of U.S. experts has arrived in Moscow. This very large team is led by Paul Nitze and it includes Rowney, Kampelman...

[Zorin interrupts] Perle, who is not unknown!

[Bovin] Perle. Yes. They will hold consultations here concerning nuclear and space weapons. They are major figures in U.S. disarmament policy. Frankly, they basically deal more with rearmament than disarmament. Yet just the same, they will hold talks. In other words, preparations are in progress. But I repeat, from my point of view, the issue has not yet been solved unequivocally. And there is hardly anything strange in that, because when we talk about Soviet-U.S. relations and our talks with the Americans, it is a long distance race, and it is necessary to watch both Reagan and what will come after Reagan and be ready to cover that long distance. This is how I would put it.

[Zhurkin] Indeed, most probably the problem has to be viewed in several dimensions at once: First of all, in the dimensions of the present day, of all the burning issues of the day; secondly through the prism of the remainder of President Reagan's term, because, whether he likes it or not, the President and most of the people surrounding him have started moving toward the U.S. history textbook.

[Bovin interrupts] But the problem is how you will get into the textbook, with a plus or minus sign.

[Zorin] They say that it is considerably easier to blunder in history than to enter it [legche vlipnut chem v neye voyti].

[Zhurkin] We shall see. Obviously we must all look at this entire series of the most important political events also through the prism of what there will be after Reagan. We must think about that and think about it all the time. And not only about those who will come right after Reagan but generally about what the United States will be like in the nineties, the America which we will have to deal with then. Most probably it will not be easy then, either.

Returning to the present day, I think that it is necessary to make a final evaluation of this letter, this message of Reagan's. And probably the final evaluation will be simple. The ball is still in the U.S. court. No answers have been given yet to the Soviet proposals, the very fundamental Soviet proposals which have been evaluated as such, both in the United States and the entire world. So the word still remains with the United States, the Reagan administration. It still has to think how it will act in the present, very acute situation.

[Zorin] It may be that one of the causes of the unusual leak, that we have discussed, and of the ballyhoo started prematurely by U.S. propaganda and official leaders, lies precisely in what you say, Vitaliy Vladimirovich: the feeling that no proper reply has been given; the feeling that the U.S. position is not arousing and will not arouse satisfaction among the public. And for this reason, substituting real steps with noise and intensifying propaganda with all kinds of inventions, and substituting real steps with propaganda fireworks may also be the aim and is being pursued by the organizers of the campaign of recent days.

Well, our time on the air has expired. It remains for me to thank you for taking part in our discussion, thank our television viewers, until we meet again, here in our studio.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S SECRETARY RUEHL VIEWS CURRENT STATE OF GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Jul 86 p 10

[Article by Lothar Ruehl, State Secretary in the FRG Ministry of Defense: "Basic Revision or Superficial Move? An Analysis of the Soviet Arms Control Proposals"]

[Text] The strategic dialogue between West and East that resumed after the election of Gorbachev as secretary general of the CPSU in March 1985 is developing with a number of Soviet proposals, a great propaganda effort in the East and obviously slowed momentum in Moscow with regard to a second meeting of both superpowers. The question is one of confrontation or agreement. It can be assumed in light of the rhetorical preliminaries which have been going on since January 1984 that Gorbachev has a personal interest in carrying out negotiations and reaching a political arrangement with the U.S. With what goal in mind is he doing this, however, and to whose advantage will this accrue?

The answer to this political question, which overrides all technical arms control details involved in a possible agreement, can be found only in the long-term foreign policy planning and long-range strategy of the Soviet Union. The most fundamental question of all is therefore: is a fundamental revision, a critical reexamination of Soviet policy towards the United States and--should the need arise--towards the Western European allies of the American superpower underway? Or is it simply a question of a superficial move in the forefront of key Soviet positions with regard to the West?

The bottom line of all of the Soviet negotiating proposals points on the one hand to a movement to several Western viewpoints, but on the other hand it indicates a rigid adherence to old Soviet demands, some of which have gone unchanged for almost two decades. One example: the demand that all American combat aircraft with a nuclear capacity that are stationed abroad must unilaterally be counted among "strategic" American weapons, because these Nuclear Delivery Vehicles could reach the Soviet Union from their "forward" bases, was tabled, to be sure, at the SALT talks in 1972 and 1979, but was nonetheless basically retained. In its most recent proposals for reductions of 30 percent in strategic systems, the Soviet Union excludes the so-called "forward based systems" (FBS), but it has indicated in Geneva, however, that it will continue to call for their inclusion with reductions of 50 percent.

Earlier Reduction Proposals Remain on the Negotiating Table

On the positive side, the balance sheet shows basically four Soviet concessions--each of which contains basic restrictions:

1. The willingness to substantially reduce the number of strategic intercontinental offensive systems in the form of a reduction of 50 percent. This essential point in the negotiating proposals of both sides was once again confirmed in the summit declaration of 21 November. For the time being, the Soviet Union is not departing from this common basis with its new SALT proposal of 11 June 1986 for an interim agreement with reductions of 30 percent. Its earlier reduction proposals also remain on the negotiating table. The further progress of negotiations will show whether the Soviet Union is still interested in the principle of drastic reductions or whether initial American interpretations are valid, according to which the Soviet Union has taken a step backward with its new SALT proposal. The Soviet Union has not yet abandoned grounds for an agreement on this question.

2. The fundamental readiness to limit the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles--in line with the U.S. position--to a maximum of 6,000. To be sure, the Soviet Union included here, in addition to the land-based ICBMs, submarine-based ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the "heavy bombers" (B-52, Bear, Bison) on the American side, also all medium-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and carrier-based aircraft with a nuclear capability. It also counted short-range attack missiles (SRAM) and free-falling bombs among the "nuclear charges." Nonetheless, there was one possible area of agreement concerning an upper limit for the number of warheads on land-based ICBMs: Washington proposes 3,000, Moscow up to now 3,600 implicitly, i.e. not more than 60 percent of 6,000 on one of the three components of strategic delivery vehicles: ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers.

In addition to these upper limitations for warheads, which originated with the idea of a 50 percent reduction, the Soviet Union has now set a limit with its most recent proposal of a total of 8,000 warheads on strategic delivery systems, i.e. an increase of about one-third. This increase is consistent with the Soviet position regarding the FBS: the Soviet Union maintains that in the case of a 50 percent reduction, the strategic importance of these systems would increase and they would therefore have to be included in the American upper limits for strategic weapons. But now that this is temporarily being dispensed with because of the inclusion of the FBS, the Soviet Union is correspondingly raising the upper limits. Furthermore, it also explains this step with its "concession" that it is now willing to admit wide-ranging sea and air-based cruise missiles (the Soviet Union itself has been deploying the latter since 1985).

On the other hand, despite the increase in the overall upper limit for warheads to 8,000, it is holding firm to the 60 percent principle in the distribution of these among ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. This step reduces the previous likelihood of reaching an agreement, particularly because the maximum number of warheads on ICBMs now can climb to 4,800 (60 percent of 8,000). This fosters American concern that the Soviet Union thereby intends to secure for itself a first-strike capability against land-based strategic targets--

particularly the approximately 1,000 Minuteman II and III silos in which parts of the MX potential are also to be deployed. Target coverage capabilities with Soviet ICBM warheads in a ratio of 4.8:1 cannot be acceptable to the United States.

This ratio would continue to worsen dramatically at American expense if the U.S. reduced its silo-based missiles within the framework of the proposed reductions.

The Soviet Union must permit the question to be raised of how an increase in the overall upper limit for warheads as a compensation for the "inclusion" of wide-ranging cruise missiles, for both parties after all, is to be brought into harmony with an increase in the permissible warheads on land-based intercontinental missiles. It has the opportunity of returning to common grounds for an agreement by departing from its 60 percent principle. Likewise it will have to explain why it attributes the same strategic quality to free-falling bombs and to the much more dangerous ICBM warheads.

3. The basic willingness to eliminate all land-based medium-range weapons with a greater cruising radius (1,000-1,5000 km; LRINF) in Europe and bordering regions including the destruction of missiles, warheads, launching ramps and "auxiliary constructions" (meant here are apparently the infrastructure and logistics in the deployment areas.) However, this willingness is limited regionally to a European zone and excludes the easternmost regions of the Soviet Union. Therefore this does not correspond to Western demands for the world-wide elimination of these weapons.

Apparently Positive Elements in the Soviet Proposals

4. An agreement not to count the weapons systems of third countries, i.e., France and Great Britain, on the American side within the framework of an INF treaty between Washington and Moscow. To be sure, since 1985 an indirect inclusion of these British and French weapons has been called for in diverse variations, either through a "freeze" of their arsenals, i.e. a stop imposed by both of these West European powers on the implementation of their armament programs for the modernization and enhancement of their strategic weapons, or in any case a halt in increasing the number of warheads. This condition contradicts the Western demand that nuclear weapons of third countries not be included in an America-Soviet INF agreement.

An only apparently positive element in the Soviet proposals is the suggested withdrawal of the SS-12/22 missiles (with a range of c. 900 km), which have been deployed since 1983 as a so-called "countermeasure" on the western forward front in central Europe (GDR and Czechoslovakia). Within the framework of a zero solution for LRINF, the withdrawal of these missiles would be a matter of course for which the Soviet Union could not take additional credit. Otherwise, it should also be remembered that with this step the latter would, to be sure, move back the subsidiary strike capacity once again in relationship to the options that the SS-20 offers against Western Europe, but would retain land mobility for redeployment at a later date.

The following entry must be made on the negative side of the balance sheet:

1. The already-mentioned Soviet definition of "strategic" delivery vehicles (Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles) according to the Soviet "FBS" criterion of the so-called "forward-based" offensive systems, which has remained unchanged since 1969. This definition is based on the geographical and structural asymmetry of the East-West security situation: all nuclear-capable delivery vehicles which can reach the sovereign territory of the negotiating partner are to be regarded as "strategic." The Soviet Union does not have overseas "forward-based" nuclear weapon systems directed against America. This would mean that all such weapons systems of the Americans overseas and on the high seas, in particular tactical combat planes, would be included, but not Soviet weapons systems of comparable and greater range, such as the SS-20, which can reach American forces and allies of Washington in Europe and Asia with nuclear weapons, but not the United States itself (with the exception of Alaska). According to Soviet statistics presented at Geneva, this one-sided definition of "strategic weapons" assigns to the United States a total of 3,364 systems; 2,215 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; 209 LRINF guided missile systems (a figure which cannot be duplicated as of the end of 1985, since the NATO deployment had fallen far short of such a dimension); 560 sea-based tactical combat planes (on aircraft carriers); 380 "medium-range" combat planes, land-based in Europe and Asia.

Aside from the fact that this figure of 940 aircraft is much larger than the number of actual nuclear-capable tactical combat planes, it includes practically all American fighter planes on the high seas and overseas for a dual set of tasks: use with conventional and nuclear weapons, and thereby the bulk of the conventional offensive air capability of NATO in Europe.

The Soviet Union claims for itself 2,504 "strategic" offensive systems. These two base figures of 3,360 (rounded off) for the United States and 2,500 (rounded off) for the Soviet Union would result, in the case of a 50 percent reduction, in 1,608 "strategic" systems for the United States as compared with 1,250 for the Soviet Union. The American side of this artificial "strategic" balance, however, would be weighted down with about 1,140 non-strategic systems (940 aircraft plus 200 LRINF guided missile systems), so that after a 50 percent reduction only 540 original "strategic" systems would remain to the Americans, as compared with 1,250 for the Soviets. This would be less than half of the number of the Soviet strategic delivery vehicles: approximately 43 percent of the remaining Soviet arsenal. This calculation basically continues to be valid, even if the Soviet Union now suggests within the framework of its proposals an "interim solution" consisting of a bilateral reduction in the number of strategic delivery systems to 1600. At the latest in subsequent reductions of 30 to 50 percent, the Americans would be once again confronted with the Soviet definition of "strategic" weapons.

It is clear that the Soviet Union is thereby pursuing four long-term goals, insofar as it is not simply acting out of reasons of negotiating strategy and would once again give these up in the course of the Geneva talks by proposing corresponding concessional demands:

a) To render the United States incapable of protecting its overseas allies by means of "extended deterrence" with flexible regional offensive nuclear forces as compared with Soviet offensive options;

b) Depriving NATO of the means of flexible reaction and thereby ensuring Soviet escalation superiority in Europe, i.e. the ability to determine the terms of military conflict in the event of war;

c) To critically reduce America's global ability to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons to the Soviet offensive potential and to deprive the United States of utilizing the global flexibility of its strategic means;

d) Thereby also supporting the wing of the conventional air strike capability of NATO in Europe, while the conventional as well as the nuclear air strike means of the Soviet Union and its allies in Europe and in Asia would be unreduced; this would upgrade the conventional offensive strength of the land-based forces of the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe in both strategic-operational and in political terms.

2. As a condition for reductions of 30 as well as of 50 percent in strategic weapons, the Soviet Union is calling for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range American weapons in Europe. It thereby once again establishes a linkage between the START and INF negotiations. The Soviet objective appears to be to use the INF material as a leverage in order to exercise pressure via the Western European countries on America. At the same time, this Soviet approach underscores that fact that Moscow continues to regard medium-range American weapons in Western Europe as "strategic" weapons.

3. In the case of a zero solution for LRINF guided missile systems that is limited to Europe, the Soviet Union would be able to continue to maintain a considerable offensive potential of SS-20 LRINF medium-range missiles and later also of SSC-C-4 land-based cruise missiles in the Far East, and would be able to reposition them against the European NATO territory because they can be shipped and are maneuverable on land. Even without being moved towards the West, these medium-range missiles would be able to reach targets in North European and South European NATO territory from a deployment area near Novosibirsk (east of the 80th degree of longitude). The strategic function that the Soviet government claims that these missiles have in the Far East, i.e. to counter threats in eastern Asia and in the Pacific coming from American offensive forces stationed there, does not alter anything with regard to these possibilities. Furthermore, such a deployment of medium-range missiles outside of an area that had been free of such weapons (in this case the Soviet Union west of the 80th degree of longitude) would give rise to the possibility of stockpiling more missiles, rocket stages, launchers and warheads with accessories and in this way building up a reserve of materials which could quickly be assembled into operational weapons systems. These would also be free of modernization prohibitions.

For this reason, a zero solution for LRINF guided missile systems that is limited to Europe is not acceptable. Even on-site inspections would allow the

possibility of non-compliance. The West would be well advised to hold firmly to its proposal for the total world-wide elimination of all LRINF guided missile systems.

4. The Soviet Union continues to refuse to discuss medium-range weapons (SRINF--150 to 1,000 km) at the same time as and in relation to LRINF weapons within the INF framework. This means that it wishes to keep open for itself evasive possibilities of an agreement with the following weapons: about 100 SS-12/22 (with a range of c. 900 km); approximately 600 SCUD (a range of c. 300 km), as well as its follow-up system, the SS-23 (a range of c. 520 km), the introduction of which has already begun.

These weapons cover not only the FRG, but to some extent also the territory of the allies. Their continual modernization opens up a multitude of options to the Soviet Union in the nuclear, conventional and chemical areas. Most of the strategically important NATO establishments (nuclear weapons, air defense stations and headquarters) lie within the range of the SCUDs. This threat must also be reduced by means of political efforts focusing on arms reduction. A power ratio of 600 to zero in the range of 150-500 km alone, with currently unlimited upgrading and modernization possibilities, should not be overlooked.

5. All Soviet proposals by and large continue to disregard the security requirements of Western Europe and presume that Washington will accept unequal agreements to the unilateral advantage of Moscow. In the definition of "strategic" delivery vehicles and the non-inclusion of Soviet combat aircraft with nuclear capability in relation to Western Europe and Turkey, this becomes just as clear as in the non-inclusion of the SRINF, which leaves Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles with a range of below 1,000 km that are pointed towards Europe untouched (the SS-12/22 could, after a withdrawal towards the western Soviet Union, quickly be redeployed against Western Europe as well) and in the demand for a restriction of the strategic potentials of France and Great Britain. This restriction is to become effective despite the fact that comparable and wide-ranging Soviet nuclear weapons systems, which could threaten both of these countries and all of Western Europe from the sea (SLBMs) and from the air, would not be included in such an agreement.

6. The Soviet manner of negotiating in Geneva still prevents a clarification of verification possibilities for treaties. This is true particularly of the INF weapons, with the Soviet Union persistently refusing to negotiate in a parallel way concerning reduction and verification modalities. In the strategic area, it has presented control proposals precisely for those weapons systems on which Moscow is calling for a complete ban, i.e. for mobile ICBMs.

7. Moscow continues to reject talks aimed at limiting the throw weight of missiles, for which America is seeking a 50 percent reduction. The American objective of limiting in particular the throw weight of the heavy intercontinental missiles, the SS-18 with silo-targetability is rejected by the Soviet Union. The proposal for a 30 percent reduction which--according to the Soviet viewpoint--implicitly contains clearly higher limits for ICBM warheads underscores Moscow's refusal in a dramatic way.

What this means is indicated by the example of Moscow's disregard for SALT guidelines in the new development of the SS-25, 72 systems of which have been deployed already.

The Soviets claim that the SS-25 is a further development of the SS-13, although this new missile clearly surpasses the 5 percent limit on modernization both in terms of launch weight as well as in terms of throw weight (cf. FAZ of 36 June 1986). The throw weight of the SS-25 is about 90 percent greater than that of the SS-13, a fact which enables this new rocket to accommodate two 300 kg warheads in its 800 kg total throw weight (which furthermore disregards the SALT stipulation according to which the weight of a warhead may not represent more than 50 percent of the throw weight). If the throw weight of the missiles were to be universally reduced by 50 percent, the multi-strike layout of such systems that is achieved when they are equipped with multiple warheads (MIRV) could be effectively prevented and a narrow range could be set for the proliferation of the number of guided weapons.

Prospects Not Very Favorable for a Breakthrough in Arms Control

The diverse proposals put forth by the Soviets at the negotiating table and Gorbachev's public speeches to the peoples of the West on behalf of nuclear disarmament do not address such technical requirements for an effective arms control for the reduction of destabilizing offensive capabilities. The Soviet proposals as they now stand give no overall or detailed indication that a breakthrough is imminent in arms control, either globally or in areas relevant for Europe.

It remains for a second effort to be made at the highest level, in the preparation of a new Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, to try to eliminate the most serious obstacles to rapprochement, without neglecting critical strategic and security requirements relative to arms control policies for the preservation of the crisis equilibrium of West-East relations. This will be an especially difficult task for the American negotiating partner as well as for a political consensus among the allies concerning suitable proposals and minimum demands for an agreement.

The relation between strategic offensive and defensive systems will then finally move into the focal point of a perspectivist consideration of the development possibilities of the complex Geneva negotiating process. The overriding interest of both sides lies in this central area, whereby the special security considerations of Washington's European allies in limitations and in eliminating the Soviet offense superiority will have to be protected with nuclear and conventional forces from the NATO partners.

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CSO: 5200/2727

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S PETROVSKIY ON GORBACHEV STYLE, SUMMIT, NST

LD072104 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1910 GMT 7 Aug 86

[From the "Panorama" program; correspondent Alajos Chrudinak interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy; date and place not given; Petrovskiy in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation -- recorded]

[Text] [Chrudinak] Since Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary the Soviet Union's foreign policy, methods have changed, the style of its international politics has altered. In other words, in Soviet policy one can observe new features, a new kind of foreign political approach, attitude. In your opinion, what has changed?

[Petrovskiy] I think you are justified in asking this question. Really, since the session of the Central Committee held in April 1985, a new way of thinking has been introduced in our foreign policy. This new kind of thinking, which determines how our state acts in international affairs, is in brief nothing else but a sort of amalgam of the philosophy of staying alive, of survival, which makes only one kind of conduct possible, that of cooperation among states. Therefore, this philosophy of staying alive has to be alloyed with concrete, practical, deeds that promote and make possible the radical reordering of international relations on the basis of democratic principles. A new style is beginning to be introduced in our country in the shape and conduct of democratic -- I beg your pardon -- of international relations. I would say that this style is democratic; it is a style that is based on the generally accepted, civilized norms of international contact. It is a style that promotes cooperation and mutual understanding among people.

[Chrudinak] Does this new approach, this new style, appear first and foremost in General Secretary Gorbachev's latest, numerous new proposals and initiatives? In other words, in what does this new style and outlook, manifest itself?

[Petrovskiy] It manifests itself in the fact that the proposals we place on the negotiating table, or those we submit at various international forums, are not just initiatives that have been formulated in Moscow. They are initiatives that also take into consideration others' proposals, those proposals that strive to approach and resolve international affairs, world political issues, in a realistic way.

[Chrudinak] Why, I wonder, does the Reagan administration not understand or recognize this new Soviet style? Or is it rather that this style confuses it? What is your opinion?

[Petrovskiy] I think that the acceptance of this new style, of this new method of approach, depends first and foremost on the recognition of the realities that exist in the world. It is a question of realities, which, as I have mentioned already, leave us no alternative but cooperation. Naturally, the various states have different national interests and these national interests are motivated by social and other viewpoints. But we have to rise above narrow national interests. We have to be guided by the realization that we live in a world which, while contradictory, is nevertheless founded on mutual dependence.

[Chrudinak] Excuse me, I would like to once again return to the basic issue. Does this, then, mean that President Reagan found the old Soviet style much more pleasing? Or in other words, was the Soviet Union's former foreign policy style more favorable to him than the present one?

[Petrovskiy] Well, I do not know how I should judge Reagan in concrete terms. It is difficult for me to talk about what is in the heads of Reagan and his men. But I hope that finally the realistic direction will be victorious in the U.S. foreign policy.

[Chrudinak] This, then, means that the Soviet Union's foreign policy style has changed. But for the time being the style of the United States has not. Still, it would seem that some kind of change has been visible of late. However, I cannot say if it is merely a question of some kind of smile diplomacy, or if perhaps more serious things are happening, because in the last few days President Reagan described the June proposals of General Secretary Gorbachev as a turning point. Other U.S. politicians, on the other hand, are saying these days -- as yesterday Reagan himself was claiming -- that these proposals are merely propaganda maneuvers.

[Chrudinak] What has really happened? In your opinion, what has happened in the White House on the topic of the Soviet proposals of June, to speak about a turning point?

[Petrovskiy] Well, what can I say about that? Naturally, it, in itself, undoubtedly is a good thing; it appears to be a good sign, that the proposals coming from Moscow are evaluated favorably. However, in order for us to be able to make a final judgement on what it means now, concrete deeds, concrete answers would be necessary on the part of the Americans.

[Chrudinak] Are you thinking of mutual concessions and therefore a compromise?

[Petrovskiy] That is exactly correct.

[Chrudinak] My conviction is that it is essential in order for you to be able to in the end, sign some kind of agreement.

[Petrovskiy] That is exactly so. The new style, the new way of thinking naturally presupposes compromise. There is no agreement without compromise. There is need for movement toward one another. We strive for a rational compromise; a compromise that accords with the equal and reciprocal security of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies alike. Without compromise not a single issue can be resolved.

In the nuclear and space age the basis of achieving political agreements is compromise, a basis of agreements that take into consideration the balance of the interests of the opposing sides.

[Chrudinak] A debate is now going on over the date of the Soviet-U.S. summit. How do you view it? Is there any possibility at all of this long-expected summit between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan taking place some time at the end of this year?

[Petrovskiy] Again I can only speak about what concerns us. We would like this meeting. We regard summits as an extremely important mechanism that enable progress toward the settlement of political problems between various countries.

[Chrudinak] It is very interesting for me that President Reagan now emphasizes that he reached agreement with General Secretary Gorbachev... that Gorbachev promised him they would meet again this year, as if the Geneva summit consisted only of such a promise.

[Petrovskiy] In connection with that I would like to say -- perhaps it does not sound overly diplomatic from me, but I must say it -- that here we might be witnesses of a certain displacement of emphasis. Precisely in Geneva the agreement came into being that we should endeavor to prevent the arms race in space, end the arms race on earth and normalize Soviet-U.S. relations. For precisely this reason, with this aim, we expressed our readiness for the next summit meeting. It is only an instrument. I say that the summit is not an end in itself, it is only an instrument for solving the important issues on the agenda in world politics and in Soviet-U.S. relations alike.

[Chrudinak] Now is there not any possibility of such a summit? Do you not now see any possibility of this?

[Petrovskiy] Well, as I said, the stance of the other side ought to be accurately known. However, we can speak with full resolution about our own stance.

[Chrudinak] In your opinion what are the most important conditions for the summit between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan?

[Petrovskiy] I would rather avoid the expression "conditions", because...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] But they say that the Soviets attach conditions to the meeting.

[Petrovskiy] We are not speaking about conditions. We are of the opinion that a summit must have substance. The meeting must be filled with realistic, practical substance. In the second place, a suitable atmosphere would be necessary.

[Chrudinak] Nevertheless, what kind of concessions does the Soviet Union await from President Reagan?

[Petrovskiy] Look, we are of the opinion that the fundamental problem now -- and the problem is connected to it -- is that we cannot permit the spread of the arms race to space, and we must also prevent it on earth. For that reason, one of our most important proposals says -- by the way it takes into consideration the stance of the U.S. side too -- that we must agree that we will not avail ourselves of the opportunity to break the agreement concluded on antimissile defense systems; in accordance with that, we must draw the boundary between the permitted and prohibited research mentioned in the agreement.

We have a realistic attitude toward that issue. We believe that we must accept the level of research the United States has achieved to date; but the use of the various weapon prototypes and models for space weapons experiments must be banned.

[Chrudinak] What concessions is the Soviet Union willing to make, if you are allowed to speak about it at all?

[Petrovskiy] Why might it not be allowed? Naturally it is allowed, indeed, in my opinion we must speak about it. We are ready in every sphere to go halfway toward them, halfway. I have spoken to you about topics related to antimissile systems and space weapons.

[Chrudinak] But what compromise do you consider possible?

[Petrovskiy] We have also proposed other compromise frameworks. In this connection we have proposed, for example, that we approach on a compromise basis the solution of problems related to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

However, the U.S. side categorically rejected the entirely rational demand of ours, that among the strategic weapons able to reach one another's territory...

[Chrudinak interrupting] The intercontinental missiles.

[Petrovskiy] Yes, that we must count, list among them the advanced-based combat equipment, the missile-carrying aircraft, as well as the bombers sited in Europe. That is why we postponed the discussion of this issue, and we examined only the affair of ICBM's as well as the missiles placed on submarines and heavy bombers. Please -- we have given them an opportunity, and now we are waiting for the other side to accept our new proposals, which also take into account their interests.

[Chrudinak] Therefore, in your opinion it is not so difficult to conclude a compromise here.

[Petrovskiy] You know, personally I am of the opinion -- I can say it on the basis of specialist work experience, because I have been conducting such negotiations for many years; in the period of detente I took part in the negotiations related to both the European process and the Soviet-U.S. relationship -- I can tell you: if there is the political intention, maybe it sounds banal, but precisely if there is the political intention, the political will, then any issue can be resolved.

[Chrudinak] What does President Reagan want?

[Petrovskiy] In my opinion, Reagan does not want any kind of agreement. He wants to demolish the existing ones. We have already placed all of our proposals submitted in the interest of agreement -- we have already spoken about these at the beginning of the conversation -- on the negotiating table, and we are now waiting for a constructive reply to them. We hope that we will get these in the end.

[Chrudinak] I would like to ask you a question that seems sensitive: Let us suppose that Washington and President Reagan by no means want to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. What would happen in that instance? How would you react to that? What would you do?

[Petrovskiy] You know, I really would not like to speak about that. One of a person's characteristics is that he likes to view things optimistically. In my view, optimism is one of man's innate fundamental characteristics. But if the worse were to occur, we would have no choice other than to respond to that challenge.

[Chrudinak] How? How is it possible to respond to that?

[Petrovskiy] Response: now, you know, an arms race launched in a certain direction can always be counterbalanced with the development of weapons in the opposite direction. In this or that direction -- so that we would not allow the military balance to be upset.

But I do not believe anyone would gain from this. Not only the Soviet people, but probably the American people, and all mankind would not gain anything from this, because all of us would get into an extremely dangerous situation, all the more so because cause for special concern is given by -- it is enough if we think of the accident that occurred in our country at Chernobyl. That accident demonstrated that technology can become uncontrollable. It was a tragedy which, from a nuclear viewpoints, took place in peaceful conditions. But imagine nuclear catastrophes that can be caused with weapons -- take the accident that occurred with the Challenger spacecraft.

[Petrovskiy] In connection with that I would like to say -- perhaps it does not sound overly diplomatic from me, but I must say it -- that here we might be witnesses of a certain displacement of emphasis. Precisely in Geneva the agreement came into being that we should endeavor to prevent the arms race in space, end the arms race on earth and normalize Soviet-U.S. relations. For precisely this reason, with this aim, we expressed our readiness for the next summit meeting. It is only an instrument. I say that the summit is not an end in itself, it is only an instrument for solving the important issues on the agenda in world politics and Soviet-U.S. relations alike.

[Chrudinak] Now is there not any possibility of such a summit? Do you not now see any possibility of this?

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[Chrudinak] Nevertheless, what kind of concessions does the Soviet Union await from President Reagan?

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[Chrudinak] But what compromise do you consider possible?

[Petrovskiy] We have also proposed other compromise frameworks. In this connection we have proposed, for example, that we approach on a compromise basis the solution of problems related to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

If it had occurred in the era of space weapons, we do not rule out that it might have automatically led to the outbreak of war.

[Chrudinak] Nevertheless it appears that Washington and President Reagan want to force an arms race on the Soviet Union. Thus they would like to cause economic problems, difficulties for it, because, according to their calculations, the Soviet Union would not be able to undertake an arms race with the United States.

[Petrovskiy] The arms race of course is no gift. It is natural that the arms race is a heavy burden on our country's economy. Nevertheless, if such a challenge reaches us, we respond to it. But it is not our choice. We do not give it priority.

We have drawn conclusions for ourselves from the long lessons of history. This must also be done by the other side. We are well aware that it is not possible, and not permissible, to resolve any kind of problem with military means and an arms race. For that reason it is better if we seek a political solution.

In the Soviet Union we have now set for ourselves a very clearly determined goal: in our country we must accelerate social and economic development. We have subordinated to this every foreign political action and measure of ours, because we will achieve this goal, in any conditions. Of course, we are counting on our successfully creating favorable international conditions for this.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET REPORTS ON AUGUST CDE SESSIONS

Israelyan Speaks on Hiroshima

PM081453 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Kuznetsov report under the rubric "On Today's Topics" and the general heading "For a World of Peaceful Atoms"]

[Text] Geneva -- The main global problem for mankind in our day is the problem of survival, a problem that is equally acute and urgent for all people, V.L. Israelyan, head of the Soviet delegation, said at a plenary session of the Disarmament Conference.

Our task is, he noted, to discover common denominators in the mosaic of interests and views on the basis of which it would be possible to move the world away from the Hiroshima nightmare, not toward apocalyptic nuclear death, but toward a world free from nuclear weapons, a world of peaceful atoms and peace in space.

It would be good, V.L. Israelyan went on in his speech, if Hiroshima changed from the symbol of atom death into the symbol of peace and cooperation. This would be furthered by the implementation of M.S. Gorbachev's proposal to convene in Hiroshima a Pacific Ocean conference on the Helsinki model with the participation of countries oriented toward that ocean. The Soviet representative also expounded in detail the USSR's position on the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, which is being examined at the conference.

This position on the part of the Soviet Union was supported by other delegates in their speeches, in which they stressed that the political lessons of Hiroshima demanded active diplomacy in favor of peace and that in the atomic age you cannot think in the old terms, since in a nuclear war there can be no winner.

The speech by the head of the American delegation at the conference was sharply dissonant. He tried to shift responsibility from the U.S. military for the atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, saying that it is time to forget about this, because, as he hypocritically stated, "friendship has grown and is flourishing between yesterday's enemies." This cynical attitude to the senseless sacrifices of the nuclear bombings aroused a protest, in particular, from the International League of Women for Peace and Freedom. Fourteen members of a delegation present at the U.S. ambassador's speech stated that they condemn the American representative's irresponsible position.

CW, Space Arms Discussed

LD100924 Moscow TASS in English 0914 GMT 10 Aug 86

[Text] Geneva August 10 TASS -- Intermediate results are being summed up at the Conference on Disarmament, whose special bodies are concluding their work.

The most attention is paid to the state of affairs in the special committee for the ban on chemical arms. Practical negotiations aimed at drawing up an appropriate international agreement are under way in that working body. The overwhelming majority of the delegations express the opinion that the progress made in the work of the special committee during this part of the session of 1986, has been largely predetermined by the Soviet Union's initiatives submitted for the conference's consideration on April 22. These proposals ensured progress on a number of problems that had earlier seemed to be deadlocked. The proposals established new directions on which initial material at research level has been accumulated. This material might become the basis for agreeing upon and, subsequently, wording the parts of the draft convention.

There is no doubt, however, that greater progress could have been achieved if it were not for a contradictory stand of Western countries on a number of key problems, including such an important problem as keeping from production of lethal chemicals in the commercial industry.

Even though almost all delegations mentioned as priority aim the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and even though there exists a great number of proposals setting out in detail the attitudes of states, for instance, the USSR, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Pakistan, China, and Australia, the special committee failed to embark on a concrete discussion of this matter, the discussion aimed at working out an appropriate international agreement or agreements. The only reason for this failure is the lack of political will of the delegations of the United States and other Western countries.

During the session, representatives of various delegations stressed more than once that stagnation at the talks on such priority matters as safe development of nuclear power and a ban on radiological weapons cannot be regarded normal. The work of the special committee must be switched to practical lines, the more so since there is a substantial basis for this: the Soviet proposals set out in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of May 12.

The question of working out an all-embracing programme of disarmament has been on the agenda of the conference over many years. But even at the 1986 session, the participants, meeting in the appropriate special committee, have been unable to remove the main obstacle: the striving of delegations of western countries to prepare a register of the agreed upon statements, and not a truly all-embracing document that would suggest practical measures in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1515

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

USSR-UK CDE CONSULTATIONS--London, 12 Aug (TASS)--Consultations on questions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe have been held in London between the USSR Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office. Participating in the consultations, from the Soviet side, were head of the Soviet delegation at the conference Oleg Grinevskiy, from the British side--Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Timothy Renton. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1746 GMT 12 Aug 86 LD] /9738

SOVIET-SPANISH CDE CONSULTATIONS--Madrid, 1 Aug (TASS)--Soviet-Spanish consultations took place here on 31 July and 1 August on topical international matters, including those related to the task of a successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and also to the forthcoming third meeting in Vienna of participant states in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. Taking part in the consultations on the Soviet side were L.I. Mendelevich, collegium member of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and S.K. Romanovskiy, USSR ambassador to Spain, and on the Spanish side a group of leading employees of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs led by J. Ezquerro, director general for Europe, ministry of foreign affairs, and A. Salazary, the head of the Spanish delegation at the Stockholm conference. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1405 GMT 1 Aug 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1515

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: SALT, NUCLEAR TESTING, SDI

LD082306 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 8 Aug 86

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program, presented by international affairs commentator Igor Pavlovich Charikov; with political observers Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver and Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov; and commentator Vitaliy Sergeyevich Sobolev; at the Moscow jig-boring machine works collective]

[Excerpts] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades. You are today participants of our experimental broadcast of "International Situation -- Questions and Answers" which is being recorded not in our studio at Ostankino but at your works. As you probably know, this program is broadcast on Fridays and it is constructed on the basis of letters that we receive from radio listeners. And now we have decided to conduct this program in an auditorium so that the contact with our listeners should be as close as possible. This program will be broadcast next Friday at 2015 on the First Program of All-Union Radio, mentioning of course that the recording was made among the collective of the jig-boring machine works. After this introduction, I should like to begin the program.

We all find ourselves now under the impression of the recent speech in Vladivostok by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I have in mind the foreign policy part of it. It contains five specific proposals, the aim of which is to stabilize the situation in the area of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, to achieve peace and security in that region. Looking back now, retrospectively, we can recall Budapest in June of this year when, at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the participant states of the Warsaw Pact, an address was adopted to the member-countries of NATO and to all other states, an address on the normalization of the situation on the European continent. It dealt with how the level of confrontation between the two military-political groups could be reduced, and the normal flow of life on that continent ensured.

And, turning to the past again, let us recall 15 January of this year when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made a statement containing an even more serious, a global program, for the limitation and total elimination of nuclear weapons, calculated up to the year 2000. In this way, esteemed comrades, in less than half a year our country has made very constructive initiatives that concern not only global problems as such but also the problems of specific regions. And we can say today with sufficient degree of confidence that the Soviet side has done everything possible to get our dialogue started with the United States, to get a dialogue started with other states so that the world should become more tranquil and secure. I wanted to make this introduction in order to describe the situation as a whole. And now, any of you who wish to ask specific questions to one of the participants in our program, please come to the microphone, give your name, and ask your question.

[Charikov] Next please. Come up to the microphone. But let Tsvetov have a rest.

[Unidentified speaker] I have a question on a very major issue. I should like to hear your opinion precisely, on the prospects for the development of the Soviet-U.S. arms talks and on the prospects in general for Soviet-U.S. relations.

[Zholkver] Well, this is a very multifaceted problem, and for this reason each of us will maybe say a few words on it. First, I should like maybe to undertake a little historical digression because I had occasion to be in Vienna in the summer of 1979 at the signing of SALT, the second Soviet-U.S. agreement on strategic arms limitation. I shall not conceal that all of us Soviet journalists and journalists from many countries who had gathered there at that time, in the Hofburg Palace where that agreement was being signed, we were very glad. It was the result of difficult talks which had then been going on for approximately 7 years. And they had ended with the signing of such a important agreement. I recall that literally half an hour after the U.S. President and the Soviet leader had placed their signatures on this treaty in the Redoute hall of the Hofburg, a roundtable conversation took place there, organized by Austrian television, in which I and my American colleagues had occasion to take part. And I must say that, after we had spoken rather emotionally and excitedly under the influence of the ceremony which had just taken place, my American colleagues were not only far more restrained but, on the whole, in a number of cases openly pessimistic. They told us directly: You Russians do not understand how our U.S. economy functions. You think that it is difficult for the President to place his signature on a treaty along with your general secretary and arms production will be reduced, or -- who knows -- halted. No, they stated, this will not be the case. Once U.S. companies have received contracts from the Pentagon -- and who knows, this might have really been the case -- and have used their own funds both for design work for the production of arms and for preparing them for serial production, they will not go back, or it will be very difficult.

Unfortunately they were right. Not only was SALT II not ratified by the U.S. Senate, but the present Washington administration, as you know, is considering a total abrogation of this agreement which, although it did not formally come into force, was nonetheless observed by both sides.

[Charikov] During the 1980 election campaign when he was running against President Carter, who had signed this treaty, Reagan claimed that if he were to come to power he would immediately -- well, maybe straightaway, or maybe a little later -- but he would definitely repeal SALT II. So you see, before he had even got into the White House, as they say, he had already in advance condemned this very important document, which was worked out with great difficulty over 7 years. He had condemned this document to death.

[Zholkver] And as to whose interests the President was acting in then and is acting in now, we can find out for example in a recent edition of U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT. I risk showing it once again here. I showed it last night on television during the "World Today", which I was introducing. It contains a list of the 100 richest people in the United States. Heading the list, in second place comes Dupont, the owner of a major U.S. chemical and military-chemical empire. Production of nuclear weapons, production of space weapons and production of a new type of chemical weapons known as the binary charge, which has just been announced in the last few days, are all a source of tremendous profits for U.S. monopolies.

[Charikov] It is precisely the reason mentioned by Aleksandr Vladimirovich -- the large stake which a very narrow stratum of U.S. society has in the arms race -- this reason is preventing them from, let us say, budging, as far as one can judge from foreign press reports, at the two confidential Soviet - U.S. meetings underway in Geneva. You know that SALT I and the ABM Treaty were concluded in 1972. At the same time a Soviet - U.S. standing commission was created to resolve issues connected with the fulfillment of that treaty. After SALT II was signed -- Aleksandr Vladimirovich has just been talking about this signing -- that same commission began to study, that is, began to concern itself with verifying the fulfillment and the fulfillment of SALT II.

You know that Reagan stated his desire to renounce SALT II. Although the Soviet - U.S. consultative commission on these treaties was due to meet in September, the Soviet side proposed an early meeting in order to devote the discussion to Reagan's statement on his striving to renounce the treaty. There are talks going on there behind closed doors, so to speak, and so we shall not make any guesses, so to speak, about how things are going, but let's try in any case to establish with what objective and from what stance the U.S. side came to these talks. Well, it is clear from what stance: in order to accuse the Soviet Union of violating the SALT II treaty and by placing the entire blame for violating the SALT II agreement on the Soviet Union to renounce it anyway.

However, one cannot now approach today's world with the norms of everyday life because the world has reached a dangerous frontier. For that reason maximum effort and maximum diligence are demanded of us in order to prevent further deterioration in the international situation. Such a deterioration would be fraught with very serious consequences for the life of all mankind. So the Soviet Union's foreign policy course consists of the following -- is orientated towards the following -- to strive, whatever the cost and however difficult it may be, for an improvement in the international climate. This should not create the impression that we are trying to achieve this because we are weak. Nothing of the sort. Military parity continues to be maintained and our government and our party will never allow us to fall behind the United States from the military viewpoint, for such a falling behind would be fraught with an intensification of adventurism in U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, however, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee are sparing no effort to achieve some kind of improvement.

[Zholkver] I would add that one should not, of course, approach this issue in a primitive way by believing that the whole of America fully agrees with the White House's present course. This is far from being the case. Very broad circles of the American public -- Igor Pavlovich can say more on this since he worked there for many years as our correspondent -- those whom one happens to meet here -- you know that there was recently a large group of American scientists at the forum on ending nuclear tests and there is a group of scientists, seismologists currently working with apparatus recording nuclear blasts -- they have set up this apparatus in Kazakhstan beside the Soviet nuclear proving ground, which has been silent now for over a year and where the only thing being recorded are blasts coming from the opposite side of the planet, from the Nevada proving ground. Incidentally, this work in fact pulls the rug out from under the feet of those who, until recently, claimed that an agreement was in fact impossible because it would be difficult to monitor. It could be perfectly well monitored! Modern apparatus makes it possible to record the smallest nuclear explosions, not to mention the fact that even dances at a local dance floor can be recorded in the immediate environment, especially if the orchestra is playing a very lively tune. There is even an expression, the seismologists' dance: in order to check

apparatus, dances are organized in the immediate environment, even just a small group of people, of monitoring: it is a question of good will and it must be said that a substantial proportion of the American public stresses that under present circumstances, at a time when the Soviet Union has unilaterally extended its moratorium twice, there are no grounds for the United States not to join the moratorium -- if we don't count the interests of these 100 rich families. This factor, the growth of the world public, [as heard] not only the American public, of course, but that of the whole world, should not be left out of account, either.

[Charikov] The role of the public in the United States, Japan, the FRG, and other countries is, of course, very large in the issue under discussion here. I would like to continue a thought which Aleksandr Vladimirovich began to develop, about American public opinion.

Yes, indeed, it has sort of grown up and become more mature. After all, by nature Americans are dreadful philistines -- they do not care about anything. Their interests go no further than ordinary everyday problems, ordinary everyday problems: looking no worse than one's neighbor and so on and so forth. So that, from the political point of view, the average American is very inactive, in contrast, for example, to Western Europe or in Japan, it is a real demonstration, even when one takes into account the difference in size of population. But in the United States, in general up until recently, demonstrations were, frankly, not very impressive sights. Suffice it to mention how Americans take part in elections -- I'm thinking of presidential elections. Carter, President Carter, during whose term in office I happened to live and work in the United States. Carter was in effect elected, if we work it out, by one quarter of the entire population of the United States, because almost one half took part in the elections, of which Carter obtained a majority of about 800,000 votes. They say that New York State won the election for Carter. Slightly later on, at the next presidential election 4 years later, in 1984 [as heard], voter participation was slightly higher and the gap between the new U.S. presidential candidate, Reagan and Carter, was even wider. This indicates that over the years Americans have become more and more mature, they have begun to sense more realistically the acuteness of the situation and have even begun to sense some kind of danger for themselves if a nuclear war occurs. After all, they are constantly being told that America is remotely situated and that it can cut itself off from any attack even if the attack involves the use of nuclear weapons.

The infamous Strategic Defense Initiative, about which so much is being said, is currently being pushed everywhere in the United States, both in the serious press, to which this journal belongs, and in simpler newspapers and even on the movie screen. And, you know, it all looks pretty convincing. This picture here shows how American space facilities would operate -- launched in advance of course with the appropriate apparatus -- how they would operate if the Soviet Union were to launch a missile with nuclear warheads. It's all shown clearly: a laser from one station neutralizes the launched missile, another laser does something else, then a computer distinguishes the real missiles from the false ones and so on and so forth. In short, it's very convincing and, to speak frankly, why not admit it, there are a fair number of Americans who believe it all. They all think that the Strategic Defense Initiative is a wonderful thing and a step along the path to disarmament, a step along the path to disarmament and nothing more. They are completely unconcerned that facilities capable of striking targets on earth will be put into space -- they are not told about this cloud and even here in the U.S. NEWS journal it is not mentioned. It is not stated here that these lasers are capable of striking enemy facilities, that is, our facilities. They talk only about how these facilities will be struck as they approach the United States, at this distance between the two oceans. And that is all. For the man in the street, however, that is enough.

I would like to return to where I began. I began by saying that the average American is, all the same, maturing. A new generation is coming onto the scene, a generation which grew up during the Vietnam War and which is fairly well versed in the adventuristic, so to speak, behavior of the White House, the behavior of U.S. presidents in the past. And that is why more and more frequently we hear voices ringing out against the allocation of funds for this infamous Strategic Defense Initiative, voices advocating a return to dialogue with the Soviet Union. Moreover, these voices are fairly influential and resound quite loudly.

[Zholkver] Yes, now why I am mentioning this? A certain sobering-up from what I would call a semi-film-animation obsession with technology has taken place in the states.

Second, the Chernobyl accident, even if we ignore the again primitive intimidation of the Americans with talk about a radioactive cloud from the banks of the Dnepr reaching the banks of the Mississippi and, so to speak, destroying everything alive there and, above all, the flora there...if we ignore this -- and incidentally it soon became clear that the reality was quite different -- there remained the realization that our planet is fairly small, and that the force of the atom is a very terrible thing which can cause the most dreadful disasters -- and after all, what happened in Chernobyl, in all the tragic nature of our misfortune, was insignificant in comparison with what would happen in the event of even a single nuclear bomb exploding, not to mention an exchange of nuclear blows.

This too is sobering-up American voters, especially since American scientists themselves are talking at the top of their voices about the impermissibility of nuclear war, in which there can be no victory.

It seems to me that this factor--the factor of Americans' sobering-up--also has to be taken into account in examining the issue of the prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations, including such a complex and important issue as disarmament talks.

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CSO: 5200/1514

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: DELHI SIX ON NUCLEAR TESTS, SDI, CW, NST

LD102007 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 10 Aug 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with political observers Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin and Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov; and Vitaliy Sergeyevich Sobolev, All-Union Radio commentator]

[Excerpts] [Sobolev] Hello, comrades. Last week saw a surge in antinuclear protests throughout the world. It is clear that it was connected with another anniversary of the atomic bombing of the Japanese towns, but...

[Gerasimov interrupting] ...and also with the anniversary of the Soviet moratorium.

[Sobolev] Yes. These protests have been conducted this year on a particularly large scale and this is connected with certain new factors. First, it is just recently that scientists from various countries have been making considerable efforts to explain in a popular form that, in case of the exchange of nuclear strikes, the world is in for a fate worse than that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

[Gerasimov] Gabriel Garcia Marquez spoke on this topic in Mexico City. His speech was called The Fate of Damocles and painted a picture of a post-nuclear world: night, yellow rain, hurricanes, and cockroaches the only living beings.

[Sobolev] Yes. So on the whole, the question on the survival of mankind is, little by little, being brought home to ever increasing number of people. One may also say that the Chernobyl accident has made many people start thinking and doubting the hopes set upon nuclear arms.

However, the main thing is what you have said, Gennadiy Ivanovich, that the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests has been implemented for the last 12 months, while the United States has conducted during this period 15 experimental blasts. French and English nuclear weapons blasts have also been conducted. This contrast between the two approaches to the nuclear problem has also contributed to the activation of the antinuclear movement in recent time.

[Bovin] It concerns specifically the movement to halt nuclear arms testing as the main task now. The approach to this has become more concentrated, both by political figures and the public, within the framework of the general antinuclear movement, so to speak...

[Gerasimov interrupting] ...and halting underground tests of nuclear weapons, because as long ago as 1963, in Moscow, the treaty was signed that banned tests in all other spheres...

[Sobolev interrupting] One can see that international public opinion has just now concentrated its efforts on solving the problem of tests that seems to be solvable in the quickest and most realistic manner. We know, in particular, from, let us say, U.N. votes that, apart from the United States, France and England, practically the whole world is in favor of halting these tests. World public opinion has been expressed by the six countries -- movers of the Delhi declaration which met recently in Mexico and signed a new, Mexican declaration there.

[Gerasimov] These six countries are India, Greece, Tanzania, Mexico, Argentina and Sweden. In the new Mexican declaration, the leaders of these countries express their wish that the unilateral moratorium become at least bilateral. That is, they are speaking in a polite manner, they do not identify whose unilateral moratorium it is, and, of course, one can see from the context that they would like it to be a Soviet-American bilateral moratorium for starters. They are offering their assistance, if such a need arises, in verification; yet we know already that there are no particular technical difficulties in providing for verification of the implementation of an agreement on banning nuclear tests. The Soviet Union, by the way, is prepared to consider any suggestion on this account. [indistinct cross talk]

[Sobolev] [Words indistinct] have offered the territory of their countries to install monitoring equipment there.

[Gerasimov] A global network -- Sweden and Norway are situated on a rocky foundation, and many occurrences within the earth-crust can be monitored very well there. That is why Swedish and Norwegian seismic stations very often report, and have reported, various nuclear blasts. I would like to continue about the declaration. Additionally, it speaks about the necessity of keeping the treaty of 1972 in force on limiting the systems of antimissile defense; this is connected with peace in space. The Delhi Six member-countries are coming out against the arms race in space, of course. This, undoubtedly, an extremely important document which is bound to create significant international response.

[Bovin] When they spoke, the leaders that signed the Mexican declaration -- one theme, perhaps, was going through all their speeches. That, in fact, the fate of the entire world has found itself in the hands of two powers -- the Soviet Union and the United States. On the whole, many people are, I would say, not happy about this circumstance. The activity of these six and the activity, let us say, of some other groups, is connected with the fact that all countries and all people want to hold their fate in their own hands. They bring pressure to bear up on us and on the Americans to prompt us toward such decisions. True, there is no need to prompt us on this. This is our policy too. However, the pressure they exert on America has great political importance as the voice of the international public, that of small or medium-size states that want to play a noticeable role in deciding the fate of the whole world.

[Sobolev] Despite the fact that the U.S. leadership is, on the whole, turning down the demands by the Delhi Six, one can, nevertheless, discern changes in the U.S. political circles which may be explained exactly by the pressure of antinuclear movement. Both Houses of Congress have just adopted a decision on limiting and banning nuclear tests.

[Gerasimov] On 7 August, the Senate demanded that the President resume the talks. There are 100 people there, 64 votes for and 35 votes against. On 8 August, the lower house in U.S. Congress, the House of Representatives, approved a temporary ban on tests for a year. This is a recommendation, it does not mean that the President is obliged to bow to it but this shows the Congress' opinion, and, in any case, that of the lower house. Reagan's administration turned down, for the moment, the appeal from Mexico on the 1-year moratorium; it turned it down calling it dangerous. Why is it dangerous? The State Department gives the following explanation: The suggested moratorium will perpetuate the dangerous unbalances brought about by massive Soviet nuclear [indistinct word]. It is the same old story about a Soviet military threat.

[Bovin] Here however, the Americans stick to the following line of thinking: As long as nuclear arms remain the main deterrent, they have to be reliable. For arms to be reliable, they have to be tested.

[Gerasimov] If one stops rechecking nuclear arsenals, they become obsolete. What can be better?

[Bovin] According to our logic, this is good, because it spurs a halt to the arms race.

[Gerasimov] There is another argument: You see, those in Washington are saying that to conduct successful talks about arms control we have to arm ourselves. That is, this is the practical interpretation of the thesis on talks based on a position of strength. Just now, the problems of military allocations for the 1987 financial year are being discussed in the Congress, and one has to say that the administration has found itself in a difficult situation. Reagan asked for \$320 billion for the 1987 fiscal year for military needs. Yet both Houses came, though by different means, to a figure of \$292 billion. It is still being discussed.

This is a huge figure; however, it is smaller than the figure suggested by the administration. Its advocate Harry Goldwater, a well-known senator and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, even says that they are simply stripping us and undermining our defense. The President himself said that the growth of military expenses, or, in any case, the approval of his recommendation concerning these colossal military expenses, is absolutely necessary. For what? To continue to negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union.

[Bovin] It is precisely this that he is using to pressure senators, to pressure congressmen — that by reducing funds for defense you prevent me from holding talks. That, in fact, is the hook...

[Gerasimov interrupting] Edward Markey, a member of the House of Representatives, had the following to say on this subject: Is it not ridiculous that the administration is seized with a fit of passion for arms control at the very time Congress is beginning its discussion on defense expenditure?

[Soloviev] Talking about the actions of the Delhi Six, I think it should be noted that they are concentrating their efforts not only on solving the problem of banning nuclear tests but also on preventing the militarization of space, since this is creating a dangerous future for mankind. Apart from that, the militarization of space is still only in an embryonic stage and it is easier to give up weapons which do not exist than to liquidate ones that do. It should be mentioned that in the course of an exchange of confidential messages which took place this summer between the Soviet and U.S. leaders,

the subject of preventing the militarization of space was given a prominent place. In June, Comrade Gorbachev sent a message to President Reagan and in July a reply was received from the U.S. head. This reply has not been published yet and as the President himself just said, he does not intend to publish it.

[Bovin interrupting] However, I think it has been rumored all over the world by U.S. journalists who are past masters at all kinds of leaks, and as far as I understand, the basic parameters of this letter are known to the world public. I fully recognize that there may be certain nuances in it and that if one were to read the text closely it is possible we could find some positive points in it, some advances in the right direction. However, judging this letter by what our American counterparts write about it, I, for example, do not yet see such positive elements. For example, this same star wars problem...

[Sobolev interrupting] But let's first of all explain what Reagan's proposal consists of, at least according to the way the American press describes it. The proposal maintains that the United States assumes the obligation not to deploy space weapons for a period of 7 years...

[Bovin interrupting] ...and these 7 years are made up of two periods: for the first 5 years, according to Reagan's idea, both we and the Americans engage in research, development, and testing within the framework of the ABM Treaty. Our position on this is positive, but we propose a (?15) - 20 year laboratory research period.

[Gerasimov] Under a roof.

[Bovin] Yes, under a roof. The Americans propose research, that is testing practically at a full scale on a proving ground, and calling this research within the framework of the ABM Treaty, which, in fact, contradicts what is written in that treaty. The 5-year period in itself is, on the whole, a practically absolutely insignificant period. Abrahamson, for example, says, and all Americans say that...

[Gerasimov interrupting] Abrahamson is the very man in charge of the strategic...

[Bovin interrupting] ...Yes, that they will not will not be able to begin deploying their systems in less than 10 years, so that it is not clear what benefit this 5-year period brings. However, Reagan's logic is as follows: If during these 5 years, research establishes that such systems could be created, then there will be 2 years for talks between us and the Americans. What will the talks be about? About a smooth transition to an era of defense systems. That is, the Americans want to come to an agreement with us on how to deploy and at what pace to deploy these systems in space, so that we and they both do this. But if these talks do not meet with success then either side...

[Gerasimov interrupting] -- Each side (?can do as it wishes).

[Bovin] Yes, wishing to do so they can deploy them having informed the other side 6 months in advance. Reagan actually wants us to legalize the star wars program with our signature -- that is what all his, so to speak, arguments come down to.

[Gerasimov] I would say that there is nothing new in that commentary. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote about Reagan's idea that it is a trick, that the main idea, as the newspaper put it, of the letter is a trick aimed at persuading Moscow to join the United States in throwing the 1972 ABM Treaty into the gutter.

[Bovin] If we are to sum it up on the spot, the Americans are simply saying that they will do as they wish. But the interesting thing is -- that is all correct; it has to be said that those who are to the right of Reagan have become alarmed. In Congress there is a mood in favor of reducing the star wars allocation and these people are terribly afraid that even the hint of such a moratorium -- let's say, a 5-year moratorium on deployment -- could once and for all derail the financing of star wars. Thus, Reagan is also being put under pressure from that side, from the side of even more conservative elements. Their anxieties, in my view, have little justification.

[Sobolev] It seems to me that all this is two sides of one and the same orchestrated propaganda campaign.

The thing is that the American press is portraying the American compromise very optimistically as if it really were a step forward in the direction of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the President himself spoke about this and the fact he felt revived hopes of progress in the disarmament process. Those pessimists whom you have just mentioned -- that is, the neoconservatives who, in essence, form the current U.S. policy, both domestic and foreign -- when they express their alarm over the fact that these pseudo-compromises allegedly express the President's secret desire to do his utmost to liquidate all systems and that now the legislators, having lost interest in it, will cease financing it, from the propaganda point of view this is also publicity in favor of these American pseudocompromises, though it is publicity presented the other way around. From the political view point, this, on the whole, is a barrier to all hopes that it will really be possible to prevent the militarization of space. It must be mentioned that, since the letter was sent, the President has stated that the SDI program will be rigorously carried out. So where, then, are the compromises?

[Gerasimov] He is always stressing that it is an inviolable program -- a sort of sacred cow -- and that it is not a subject for negotiations.

Well, if it is not a subject...[changes thought] on the whole there is, of course, a very great deal of criticism in America of this position. For example, Gerald Smith, a former specialist in this field and head of an American delegation to talks on this subject, wrote the other day in THE NEW YORK TIMES that Reagan is thereby destroying the support -- referring to the ARM Treaty -- Reagan is destroying the support on which arms control stands.

[Sobolev] The United States is taking up the same inflexible stance on chemical weapons, too. Despite mass public protests, both in the United States and in West Europe, and despite realistic proposals from the Soviet Union aimed at avoiding an arms race in chemical weapons, the United States is embarking upon the production of these chemical weapons and the deployment of them, too, is on the agenda.

[Bovin] There's a nuance here. For now, the Europeans are still playing their own game here, because U.S. chemical weapons that are currently in West Europe have to be removed from West Europe and new weapons must not be brought into West Europe before the onset of a crisis.

[Gerasimov interrupting] A state of emergency.

[Bovin] So the Europeans, in approving their position to us in the following terms: It remains to be seen whether or not there is going to be any state of emergency -- most likely there won't be. However, the fact that the Americans are now going to remove their existing chemical weapons from Europe is of itself a good thing.

[Gerasimov] The Americans will not be producing chemical weapons for themselves, they are not going to be used on their own territory. The military actions will be on European territory.

[Sobolev] They are now planning military actions, yes, in the European theater.

[Gerasimov] But it is interesting that even in Congress, too, there is a definite struggle around this.

[Bovin] We have already mentioned several times the fact that the Senate and the House of Representatives generally act contrary to the opinion of the White House and the opinion of the administration. In my view this is an indication of a very interesting process which is now occurring in America. On the one hand, the popularity of Reagan himself is at a high level. He's a popular president as a man, as a personality, without a doubt. But the President's policy, support for this policy, well, a process of erosion is beginning, there is a deepening of contradictions within the ruling class, the ruling American elite, which is reflected in the latest voting in Congress. Elections are due in November -- intermediate congressional elections -- and I think that there Reagan might well get unfavorable results as far as he is concerned: At least, that is what I expect, and then the situation will become even more difficult for him.

[Gerasimov] Well, you see, there are endless differences of opinion the whole time within the administration, in particular in the area of Soviet-American relations, where there are eternal differences. And what's more meetings between Soviet and American experts have in fact now started.

[Bovin] Yes, and they've sent some fairly difficult characters...

[Gerasimov interrupting] That's what I wanted to mention. A series of meetings has begun between Soviet and American experts to prepare for the meeting between foreign ministers. The meeting of ministers has been fixed for 19-20 September. In Moscow, for example, on Monday a meeting of experts in nuclear and space armaments begins. Here is a curious fact: the sides agreed that four experts on each side would participate but the Americans...

[Bovin interrupting] I think that more than four arrived.

[Gerasimov] Yes, they sent seven people. Paul Nitze is there...

[Bovin interrupting] Who are they? There's Paul Nitze, (?Rowney)...

[Gerasimov continuing] There's (?Bishop); Perle is there.

[Bovin interrupting] Perle is there.

[Gerasimov] Perle is there, Perle who is generally regarded as ...

[Sobolev interrupting] ...as an arch-hawk.

[Gerasimov] As an arch-hawk.

[Bovin] Yes, and all of these figures are great specialists and very experienced people. All the same, if you study their careers and their political views you see that they have spent more time arming than they have spent disarming. If you like, that's how it is.

[Sobolev] Perle is called the author of all the American arms control proposals made in recent years and which have turned out to be quite unacceptable in so far as they have led to the assertion of American superiority.

[Gerasimov] The very purpose of the meeting, however, is certainly not that.

The purpose of the meeting is to look jointly at the possibilities for moving forward to the common goal which was agreed by the sides at the meeting in Geneva, the summit meeting.

[Bovin] Kampelman put it like this -- a free search, these are not going to be talks, but a free quest for ideas, that's what Kampelman said.

[Gerasimov] Well, it would be very good if ideas could be found, but the last meeting between experts on nuclear tests cannot help but give rise to disappointment. The search for ideas there did not lead to anything, given the way the American experts favored continuing tests and favored talking only about monitoring, about how monitoring of tests and the holding of tests should be carried out, about calibrating and calculating the level of an explosion. There was no talk about the essence of the matter. There was not talk about a complete ban on all tests. Naturally a complete ban is much easier to monitor than a partial ban, where calculations have to be made about whether or not a test was or was not of a particular strength. At any rate, it was a disappointing meeting of the experts. We'll have to see what this meeting is going to be like.

[Sobolev] Today as never before it is important to mobilize the existing world potential for common sense, a partnership of reason, in order to stop the slide into catastrophe. This is what Comrade Gorbachev said in his speech in Vladivostok. He noted that our resoluteness to do everything that depends on us for this is unaltered. All people of all countries and states can be certain of this. Really, understanding for the Soviet position, support for it which is getting stronger everywhere in the world, is an important positive factor of the international situation.

It is comforting to recognize that some American liberal press and world public opinion generally pay attention to the fact that when the Soviet Union speaks of peace, it reinforces these words with deeds, with acts of good will; with new initiatives, unilateral obligations; for example, the moratorium on nuclear tests and tests on antisatellite weapons, and so on. U.S. leadership also talks about peace, but its actions complicate the international situation and push humanity to the brink of the nuclear abyss. This lack of correspondence between declarations and practical policy also undermines international stability, which depends very much on trust.

[Bovin] It seems that Americans always use double standards. How do they argue? In fact, for them virtually everything is possible, but not for others. They look at the world only, as it were, through the eyes of Americans, through their own eyes. If you want to conduct negotiations successfully then you must learn to look at the world not only with your own eyes but through your partner's eyes. Otherwise, you will never sense that sphere where our interests come together, or cross, or run parallel. This

inability Americans have of putting themselves in the place of a partner, the inability and perhaps their lack of desire to experience the concerns of a partner, this is never expressed in their positions, which of course defend American interests very well, but absolutely do not take into consideration the Soviet Union's interests.

[Sobolev] For the most part it does not even defend American interests. Aleksandr Yevgenyevich.

[Bovin] Well, yes. In practice they want to have a few more missiles, while we have a few less. That's not the way to conduct negotiations.

[Sobolev] This lack of correspondence, this lack of logic, common sense, and sincerity is compensated by some very strange tricks, well, like those pseudo-concessions which, if we are to judge by the American press, were made in President Reagan's letter to the Soviet leader.

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CSO: 5200/1514

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA VIEWS DISARMAMENT, DEVELOPMENT RELATIONSHIP

PM080807 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

[A. Pavlov article: "Indissoluble Link: How Disarmament Could Accelerate Mankind's Socioeconomic Development"]

[Text] It is absolutely clear today that the arms race, which swallows up colossal resources, is one of the main barriers in the path of mankind's socioeconomic development. It does tremendous damage to international economic cooperation, scientific and technical ties, and world trade. In 1985, for instance, more than \$800 billion, according to some estimates, was spent worldwide on arms production and the maintenance of military personnel. Total world expenditure on military scientific research in the same year amounted to approximately one-fourth of all spending on scientific research and development. The annual U.S. military budget now exceeds \$300(!) billion. This is at a time when more than 400 million people in the developing countries regularly go short of food, 50 million die of starvation every year, 100 million children are in danger of starving to death, and 30 percent of children have no chance of an education.

The unproductive waste of resources on arms has a great deal to do with the developing countries' huge debt, which has now reached nearly a trillion dollars. The CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th congress pointed directly to the definite causal relationship between those countries' debt of a trillion dollars and the increase of more than a trillion dollars in U.S. military spending in the last decade. The disastrous economic position of the young liberated countries and the intensification of the imperialist powers' and monopolies' exploitation of them is one reason for international tension and conflicts in various parts of the globe.

Speaking of the processes taking place, for instance, in the countries of the vast Asian region, M.S. Gorbachev noted in his Vladivostok speech: "These states have tens and hundreds of problems that cry out for attention, some inherited from the colonial past and some rising from the contradictions of current development. Yet they are drawn into blocs, their freedom to dispose of their own resources is restricted, they are forced to increase their military budgets, and they are dragged into the arms race and the militarization of the economy and public life.

"All this distorts the processes of internal development, creates tension, and, of course, hampers the normalization of international and interstate relations."

It is quite natural that many governments, in particular those of developing countries, as well as progressive circles and international socioeconomic and political organizations, are increasingly raising questions of the economic and social consequences of the arms race in the modern world, as well as the potential inherent in disarmament for accelerating the development of all states, in particular the young liberated states. In this context the broad world public attached great significance to the international conference, which was scheduled to be held in Paris in late July and early August of this year, on questions of the relationship between disarmament and development; The 40th UN General Assembly Session adopted the decision to hold this conference.

The conference was set the task of examining a wide range of questions connected with the negative effect of the arms race and military spending on economic and social development, as well as ways and means of releasing additional resources for development purposes as a result of disarmament measures. During preparations for the conference the proximity or identity of the positions of socialist and nonaligned countries on these questions became increasingly clear.

The nonaligned countries came out actively in favor of convening the conference. The political declaration of the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Movement, adopted at the session in Delhi in April 1986, the foreign ministers of the participating states welcomed the UN General Assembly's decision to hold such an international conference and called upon all states to participate at the highest level, in order to draw up concrete recommendations.

At the sessions of the preparatory committee in New York, many nonaligned countries drew attention to the paramount significance of measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. They also proposed setting up a fund into which resources secured through reducing military expenditure would be paid.

At the same time the speeches of representatives of certain developing countries demonstrated some inconsistency: Some of them came out in favor of handing resources over to the developing states even before the implementation of any real measures in the disarmament sphere, by means of establishing a system for allocating resources to the developing countries by way of a type of "tax" on military spending. This approach could hardly be deemed rational, since under this "taxation" system the young liberated states would have an objective interest in the maximum increase in the military budgets of those states that are militarily most powerful.

From the outset the United States took a negative line on the conference. Representatives of the Washington administration clearly feared that this forum would inevitably be sharply critical of the White House's course of further spurring on the arms race and of its opposition to disarmament measures. That is undoubtedly why, in April, the United States officially announced its refusal to take part in the conference.

As a result of American pressure the Western countries' delegations toughened their position and displayed clear reluctance to work on drawing up an agreed draft final document for the conference. This emerged clearly at the preparatory committee session held in June 1986.

The leading NATO states began to pursue a line not allowing any restrictions on the increase in military budgets; to suppress criticism of their efforts to launch an arms race; and to assert that disarmament will not yield direct, immediate benefits for development. It is noteworthy that representatives of the Western powers, even during the work of the preparatory committee, were coming out against any proposals on handing

over to the developing countries some of the resources that could be released as a result of arms reduction and disarmament measures. In particular, a thesis was put forward on the "lack of a direct relationship" between disarmament and development, claiming that questions of disarmament and development must be resolved in parallel, independently of each other.

Of course, behind all this there is nothing less than the desire, in effect, to stall and frustrate the work to prepare for the conference on questions of the relationship between disarmament and development.

It was evidently not without the influence of the NATO partners that France, which had formerly proposed convening the conference in Paris, in May of this year proposed postponing it until 1987, without specifying a date.

Nonetheless, despite the pressure from Western countries and their attempts to postpone the conference to an unspecified date (or rather, to prevent its convocation), at its June session the preparatory committee came out in favor of holding this important forum in 1987. Concrete dates will be determined by a decision of the 41st UN General Assembly Session this fall.

As for the Soviet Union, the relationship between disarmament and development is indicated in the fundamentals for the creation of an all-embracing international security system formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress. They provide for the elaboration of principles for utilizing for the good of the world community, and particularly of the developing countries, some of the resources that will be released because of the reduction of military budgets.

The Soviet Union has come out and continues to come out actively in favor of holding an international conference on questions of the relationship between disarmament and development. In the USSR's opinion the conference's main task should be to examine constructively the question of ways of releasing additional resources for the purposes of development as a result of practical arms limitation measures. This line is supported by the other Warsaw Pact states. As the communique of the Budapest Political Consultative Committee conference noted, they "attach great significance to the holding of an international conference on disarmament and development in line with the UN decision." The Soviet Union and the other socialist states are doing which work in socioeconomic bodies and specialized institutions within the UN system in order to involve them in preparing for this international conference and on a wider plane in promoting the cause of disarmament and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

At the preparatory committee session held in New York in June, the USSR reaffirmed its support for the decision to convene a conference with the participation of all states. It declared its readiness to take part in the forum regardless of the attitude of any other countries. It is a matter of conviction: The conference will help to replace the principle of "arms, not development," imposed by militarism, with a different order of things -- "disarmament for development."

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CSO: 5200/1514

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA LAUDS EUROPEAN EXAMPLE OF RELATIONS

PM011057 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 86 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Europe as an Example"]

[Text] The world is at a turning point. The realities of the nuclear age, with its threat of the destruction of mankind, imperiously demand a new approach to international relations and the pooling of states' efforts for the sake of ending the pernicious arms race.

The socialist states, which organically reject war, exert a great influence on the formation of the new political thinking. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries generously enrich mankind with the ideas of peace and do not allow free rein to the dangerous ideas of the past. Global significance is attached to the comprehensive program for ridding the earth of nuclear and other means of mass destruction by the end of the 20th century and the proposals for a significant reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, backed up by such actions on the part of the Soviet Union as the moratorium on nuclear tests, which has lasted for nearly a year.

The Soviet state has now put forward concrete proposals on bringing the Asian-Pacific region into the general process of creating an all-embracing system of international security and peaceful cooperation. In building new, just relations in Asia and the Pacific, the experience that already exists there is valuable, as is the experience accumulated outside that region, above all on the European Continent.

Europe was the first experimental area on our planet for establishing relations of peaceful cooperation between states belonging to different social systems. Its shoots were so strong that even the serious exacerbation of tension did not destroy the foundations of detente. Today, one of the biggest events of postwar times is being marked for the 11th time -- the signing of the Final Act in the Finnish capital, the birthday of a unique phenomenon now known as the "spirit of Helsinki." It has withstood the first tests and continues to serve stability and peace.

The example of fruitful interstate ties on the continent is noteworthy. The USSR invariably devotes great attention to European cooperation. This month alone the political dialogue continued with France, Britain, and the FRG. As different as these countries, their history, and their foreign policies are, on a number of decisive problems of today the possibility of joint or parallel actions can be seen.

It is exceptionally important that the West European states have come out more definitely in favor of an end to the arms race and disarmament of progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. The similarity of views regarding the approach to a new meeting of the top USSR and U.S. leaders is noteworthy. The general conviction is that this meeting should end in substantial practical results, above all on problems of strengthening security and disarmament.

The preservation of all that has been achieved in the arms limitation sphere is regarded by the participants in the talks as an important prerequisite for progress in this sphere. The USSR and France agreed that the accords that now restrain the arms race and its spread to other spheres must not be allowed to be broken. [paragraph continues]

The intensive, productive political dialogue at summit level between our countries and their collaboration facilitate the turn toward a healthy course in international relations. The Soviet leadership highly values France's potential and contribution on this path.

An important step has also been taken to continue the political dialogue between the USSR and Britain in the direction of the development of mutually advantageous relations and cooperation on those questions where the sides have a common interest in lessening international tension and strengthening peace. Here mention should be made of the realistic, reasonable approach of the British side, which came out clearly in favor of the observance of the Soviet-American SALT I, SALT II, and ABM Treaties. The potential was uncovered for the joint study of such questions as the banning of chemical weapons and the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The exchange of opinions between the USSR and the FRG is of positive significance. It revealed the potential for political dialogue and businesslike cooperation in various spheres. The FRG could play an important role in improving the international situation, resolving questions of arms limitation and reduction, and strengthening security on the continent. The USSR is prepared to cooperate in these avenues. At the same time it must be noted that the West German Government's policy unfortunately bears the imprint of the past in many respects. The FRG's readiness to promote the resolution of urgent questions of disarmament and the development of constructive cooperation on a Europe-wide scale would open up new horizons for political dialogue between our countries.

The path to the establishment of the idea of detente in Europe was difficult and long. In the Western part of Europe, basically under the influence of the United States, the NATO military bloc was knocked together, and nearly two decades were wasted on the futile policy of confrontation. This negative experience should be taken into account in determining future developments in the Asian-Pacific region. It is important for the tremendous creative potential of its people, who have embarked on a unique period of rebirth, not to be wasted on militarization and the knocking together of military blocs, but to be directed entirely, without wasting resources or time, toward socioeconomic and political progress and the formation of international relations appropriate to the present level of civilization.

The inhabitants of all continents are tired of the nervous strain of confrontation and tension. The air of detente is necessary to everyone. The advancement of the all-European process is in the interests of not only the Europeans. Considerable significance is now attached to how fruitfully the first stage of the Stockholm conference ends. The attainment of agreement there on confidence-building measures could become a good

basis for mutual understanding on the question of reducing conventional arms at the second stage of the conference. Of course, development must take place in all directions -- political, economic, humanitarian, and cultural. That is our approach to the forthcoming important forum -- the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the all-European conference.

It is within Europe's power to continue the difficult turn away from the history of wars and toward the history of peaceful cooperation. This would be a contribution to the science of civilized intercourse in the nuclear age that would be worthy of imitation. Today more than ever before it is important to mobilize the potential for common sense that exists in the world and bring about a partnership of reason in order to halt the slide toward disaster. The USSR's determination to do everything in its power to this end is unswerving. All the planet's people can be sure of that.

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CSO: 5200/1516

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW WEEKLY INTERVIEWS FRG'S GENSCHER

PM061553 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 31, 3 Aug 86 p 6

[Interview with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Vladimir Markov: "Time for Fundamental Decisions"]

[Excerpt] "It's time for fundamental decisions between East and West. In order to effect a change for the better in East-West relations, it is necessary to use the real possibility of producing results at talks on a wide range of security matters," said Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West German Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, to our Bonn correspondent Vladimir Markov on his return from Moscow.

"I agree with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze," Genscher said, "the importance of our discussions in Moscow goes beyond an ordinary visit. They, undoubtedly, have contributed to a better understanding of positions held by each side, including opposing positions. The exchange of views was modified by the realization of the role and responsibility of both states in the East-West relations.

"Now we ought to open a new page in German-Soviet relations and lay a foundation for further cooperation. In this regard the visit has provided important incentives," stressed Genscher.

"The Federal Government is in favour of an appreciable improvement of East-West relations. The way to reducing the differences lies exclusively through cooperation. Cooperation is the key political concept of our time. Improved trust, frankness and security would benefit everybody.

"In practical politics we firmly proceed from the fact that the Soviet Union with its history and the cultural contribution of its peoples belongs to the part of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. We are looking for mutual understanding, cooperation and detent with the Soviet Union and our other eastern neighbours."

Question: In today's situation there is a growing realization everywhere of the need for new approaches and decisions in ensuring international security and curbing the arms race. What in your opinion plays the decisive role in that?

Answer: The Helsinki Final Act determines the course towards a durable peace in Europe. We have embarked on this path although we know how long and thorny it is. All the more the reason for moving resolutely forward along it.

The Federal Republic of Germany lies on the line dividing Europe. We realize that prevention of war and keeping peace is tantamount to ensuring the existence of the German people and their neighbours. We are convinced that no state today is in a position to ensure reliable security single-handedly, through its efforts alone. This is why the striving for disarmament and arms control has long been an integral part of our security policy.

It is important to achieve immediate results on the basis of the proposals put forward at the negotiating table. The multilateral talks are devoted to achieving a notable result at the Stockholm conference before September 19, to a complete and general ban on chemical weapons at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which we believe, is possible in the near future before December 1, 1987 and are also to discuss the first agreement at the Vienna talks.

We expect specific steps at the American-Soviet talks in Geneva towards preventing an arms race in space and stopping it on earth, the aim agreed upon January 8, 1985 and reiterated at the Geneva summit. We are especially interested in signing a treaty on nuclear medium-range weaponry. It remains our objective to completely eliminate the American and Soviet medium-range missiles. We support any balanced agreement to cut back on these systems which brings us nearer to this objective.

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CSO: 5200/1516

28 August 1986

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER: NUCLEAR ARMS, ASIAN SECURITY, NAVAL LIMITS

PM051231 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 86 Second Edition p 3

[Colonel M. Ponomarev "Military-Political Review": "Position of Reason Against 'Position of Strength'"]

[text] The world is living through an alarming and crucial stage in its development. What is needed to fundamentally improve the international situation, remove the threat of war, and strengthen the peoples' security is a new approach, political will, far-sighted decisions, and practical actions. What is needed is a new philosophy of international relations and new concepts of international security.

A new understanding of the present level of development of civilization, international relations, and peace -- this is the imperious demand of the times. It dictates the urgency of fundamentally breaking with many customary foreign policy means and methods and breaking with the traditions of political thought and views on problems of war and peace, on the security of individual states, and on international security. Just such an approach is formulated in the 27th CPSU Congress documents. The CPSU and the Soviet state are guided by just such an approach in their practical activity in the world arena. The USSR considers political means of averting the threat of war the only acceptable and possible means. This is the basis of the Soviet concept of ensuring international security in the nuclear and space age.

Awareness of the realities of this age and of the lack of an alternative to the Soviet philosophy of peace and international relations is increasingly making its way into life. This is vividly shown by the flood of comments on Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the ceremonial meeting devoted to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to Vladivostok. In Soviet policy, words are not at variance with deeds -- this is the leitmotiv of these comments. The USSR's proposals demonstrate its sincere desire to unravel the knots of dispute in international relations using political means. On the basis of an accurate analysis of the situation in the Asia and Pacific region specific initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and international security have been advanced. The Soviet Union's global approach to these problems and the political boldness and concreteness of the Soviet initiatives are particularly emphasized.

It goes without saying that not everyone in the modern, complex world has positively welcomed the ideas expounded by the Soviet leader. The position of the White House, which considers the USSR's constructive new initiatives "inadequate," remains unchanged. But, in the opinion of serious observers, Washington will not manage to play hide-and-seek and avoid replying to them for long. In the United States itself there is an appreciable increase in sentiments in favor of reaching accords with the Soviet Union and curbing the arms race. These sentiments may be found among public representatives, in articles in the mass media, and in statements by many prominent politicians.

The USSR's approach to relations with the United States is well-known. The Soviet Union, as was reaffirmed most definitely in Vladivostok, advocates peaceful, good-neighborly, equitable relations and mutually advantageous cooperation. The most important issue in Soviet-American relations today is the question of ending the arms race. The USSR has made many large-scale proposals on all the problems of reducing and eliminating arms and verifying [kontrol] this process. These proposals are widely known and can serve as the basis for settling the very acute problems of concern to all mankind.

Unfortunately, however, no U.S. countermovement is yet visible. The American "star wars" program still remains an obstacle in the way of Soviet-U.S. talks on reducing arms. The U.S. ruling circles' desire for world supremacy and for the "position of strength" policy is still perfectly evident. Even the reactionary West German newspaper DIE WELT writes: "Reagan's foreign policy is aimed at restoring American influence in the world... For this the nation must strengthen the Armed Forces."

For many years now official Washington has been continuing to build up its strategic offensive forces and general-purpose forces and implementing far-reaching militarist plans. And it does not intend to stop. This is what no less authoritative a person than Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says: "We are only in the middle of the process of modernizing our forces. We will be able to look confidently to the future if we implement the President's program in full."

So this is how Washington sees the future: mountains of weapons, the shifting of the arms race into space, and the sinister shadow of nuclear catastrophe. They do not want to reckon with realities and are continuing to make policy on the basis of illusions and delusions.

Dangerous illusions, dangerous delusions...! And they threaten increasingly dangerous consequences. The current U.S. "reforms in the defense sphere" are fraught with them. They are aimed at "enhancing America's military effectiveness," as the President's message to Congress states. [paragraph continues]

Special significance here is attached to ensuring the greatest "freedom of action" for the Pentagon and minimizing the legislative organs' control over its activity and budget.

This "freedom of action" takes the form of new hundreds of billions of dollars for the arms race and of new missiles, aircraft, submarines, tanks, and guns. Details of a comprehensive plan drafted by the administration to set up a military infrastructure designed, as THE WASHINGTON POST writes, not only to ensure the possibility of waging a nuclear war but also to "survive it, preserve our forces, and prepare to conduct new combat operations" have just become known. It is impossible not to recall the White House refusal to observe the SALT II treaty and to subscribe to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. What is more, reports have appeared in the American press that in the coming decade the United States envisages carrying out approximately 1,000 underground nuclear explosions for the purpose of modernizing existing nuclear weapons and creating [sozdaniye] "third-generation" nuclear weapons and weapons for "star wars."

We have repeatedly written about this in detail. Nevertheless, I would like to draw special attention to the measures the United States is taking to enhance the combat potential of its Navy, which has long been America's "big stick." "From the South China Sea to the Gulf of Sidra the U.S. Navy today serves as striking testimony to the new American might," the magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT writes. Breathlessly describing the large-scale buildup of the American fleet in recent years, the magazine singles out

the deployment of Trident system nuclear-powered submarines -- which, in its words, "can change the strategic nuclear balance in the U.S. favor" -- and also the creation of three new aircraft carrier combat groups and four operations groups of capital ships. The Pentagon and Navy leadership, the magazine emphasizes, is doing everything to implement R. Reagan's demand: "For us naval superiority is a necessity."

Of all the oceans, special attention is devoted to the Pacific. The aforementioned Adm Crowe pathetically exclaims: "It would be a disaster if we ever allowed the correlation of forces in the Pacific to worsen." By all accounts, certain U.S. political circles whose interests Crowe serves can only imagine the future of the Asia and Pacific region in the form of a confrontation between various countries. The actions the United States is taking lead to increased tension in the region.

These actions are frequently concealed behind various kinds of fabrications about the Soviet Union building up its armed might in the east of the country. In fact, the USSR is not doing, nor does it intend to do anything beyond what accords with the minimum requirements of defense and the protection of its friends and allies, particularly taking American military activity in that region into account.

At the same time, the Soviet Union advances a number of major initiatives aimed at ensuring the security of all countries that are drawn to the Pacific. Of special significance in this respect would be the convening of a Pacific conference modeled on the Helsinki conference and, in general, the inclusion of the Asia and Pacific region in the overall process of creating an all-embracing system of international security, which was spoken of at the 27th CPSU Congress.

Here there is a need to solve the questions of a regional settlement, of erecting a barrier in the way of the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons, implementing the Soviet proposal to begin talks on reducing the activeness of military fleets -- primarily ships equipped with nuclear weapons -- in the Pacific, radically reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Asia to the limits of reasonable adequacy, and shifting onto a practical plane the discussion of confidence-building measures and the nonuse of force in the region.

At the same time, the Soviet Union proposes beginning a broad exchange of opinions among all the interested countries in that part of the world on questions of organizing equitable, mutually advantageous, and stable trade, economic, technological, scientific, and cultural cooperation.

The strengthening of good-neighborliness and friendship among all Asian and Pacific countries and the pooling of their efforts in the common search for constructive solutions to the problems of security in Asia and the Pacific region would not only have a favorable effect on the situation in the region but also make a major contribution to the cause of preserving and strengthening world peace. This is why the Soviet Union considers it necessary to look at questions of world politics also from an Asian and Pacific viewpoint. At the same time, the USSR does not forget the main issue -- how to advance the problem of ending the arms race.

To this end the USSR has submitted important proposals during the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. They provide, in particular, for a ban on antisatellite means and on space arms of the "space-to-earth" class and a commitment by both countries not to withdraw from the treaty on limiting ABM systems for at least 15 years. At the same time, it is proposed to strictly limit new work in the sphere of ABM systems, including work under the SDI program, to laboratory research. As for verification [kontroll], the USSR has already advocated open familiarization with the activities of corresponding

laboratories. At the same time, the Soviet Union has submitted at the Geneva talks an interim compromise version for reducing strategic nuclear arms that could be implemented without delay, in 5-6 years, if an accord is reached not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 years.

The Soviet Union's major new compromise proposals on this score were set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's June letter to the U.S. President. As is known, a reply to that letter was received recently. It is now being studied, studied with all responsibility and attention, to determine how far the proposals it contains accord with the principle of equal security and whether they make it possible to arrive at effective joint decisions in the sphere for ending the arms race and preventing it from moving into space.

It is now possible to meet in the press of Western countries, and in the American press above all, many conflicting views on the messages exchanged by the Soviet and American leaders. It is felt that a skilled hand in Washington perpetrated a deliberate leak of information about the American side's position so as to see that the Soviet side's reaction would be. Let us not run ahead. The very near future must show whether the U.S. leadership will be able to abandon its hegemonist approach to problems of world politics and the desire to secure military superiority in order to be able to dictate its will to other countries and peoples, or whether it will keep to its former positions. But we must remind it once again that it must not speak with the Soviet Union from a "position of strength." The times demand that this be replaced by a position of reasons.

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CSO: 5200/1514

RELATED ISSUES

WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES SEND LETTER TO UN ON SECURITY

LD121803 Moscow TASS in English 1738 GMT 12 Aug 86

["For the Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Security" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] New York August 12 TASS -- The acting permanent representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the U.N. addressed a letter on Monday to the U.N. secretary-general from the foreign ministers of the Belorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia proposing for the inclusion in the agenda of the Forty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly the item entitled "The Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Security".

Follows the text of the letter:

Esteemed Mr. Secretary-General.

The Governments of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic propose for the inclusion in the agenda of the Forty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly the item entitled "The Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Security."

The introduction of this proposal is prompted by our grave concern for the destiny of peace and our preoccupation about the future of the peoples of the world. At present humanity is going through a new and extremely responsible and complex stage in its development. It is facing an historic choice: either to allow the further sliding down the path of confrontation and the arms race towards the abyss of nuclear self-destruction or to bring its way of thinking and acting in conformity with the realities of the nuclear and space age and restructure international relations on the basis of cooperation and interaction for the preservation of peace.

The new thinking which demands that statesmen be guided in their behaviour by the interests of the entire mankind and its survival is dictating the need for a new approach to the problems of ensuring security in the world. In the conditions of today no state, however powerful, can rely on defending itself solely by military or technological means. The maintenance of security becomes ever more a political task; its accomplishment requires a realization that reliable security of all countries and peoples, peaceful conditions for their development and progress can be achieved only by

political means and through joint efforts of all states, big and small, developed and developing, regardless of their political or social system. This implies renunciation of the use or threat of force and peaceful settlement between states. In our complex, contradictory but interdependent and generally an integral world of today security is indivisible, it can be universal and equal for all. [sentence as received]

Today it is more than ever necessary to comply strictly with the principles of respect for national independence and sovereignty, non-use or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement and other generally recognised norms of international relations.

We are convinced that the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security embracing military, political as well as economic and humanitarian fields would be in the vital interests of all states and peoples without exception.

In the military field it is more imperative than ever before to take resolute and specific measures aimed at ending the arms race, beginning real disarmament, and removing the military threat. It is vitally important to eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons completely and everywhere before the end of this century, keep outer space free of weapons, reduce military arsenals of states to the levels sufficient for the need of defence. Practical steps for the reduction of arms and disarmament, accompanied by a corresponding reduction in military expenditures of states will release enormous material, financial, and human resources for peaceful creative purposes including the overcoming of economic backwardness in many regions of the world.

In the political field in order to ensure universal security all members of the international community should work for a strict observance of the right of every people to decide independently its own destiny for the elimination of hotbeds of tension in the Middle and Near East, in Southeast Asia, in Central America, in southern Africa, and in other regions of the world, should contribute to just settlement of conflict situations and disputes between states by peaceful means, and should ensure the prevention of international terrorism.

The economic plight of developing countries and the neo-colonialist exploitation to which they are subjected are fraught with serious consequences for peace and the entire system of international relations. The interests of security in the world and in some of its regions require that efforts be made with a view to restructuring the entire system of international economic relations on democratic basis, establishing a new international economic order which would give equal economic security to all states, overcoming underdevelopment, and solving on a global and just basis the problem of external indebtedness.

The establishment of a comprehensive system of international security also implies broad cooperation in the humanitarian field. The security of states is inseparable from the struggle for the full implementation - together with respect for the sovereignty of states - of human rights in all fields and in particular of the right to life in the conditions of peace and freedom.

The United Nations has made an important contribution to the formation of both thinking and acting in a manner consistent with the nuclear and space age, to the overcoming of the extremely dangerous notions that wars and armed conflicts are admissible. The declaration on the strengthening of international security and other General Assembly declarations and resolutions, the decisions taken at its first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament, the studies prepared by the U.N. on various aspects of

international security along with the constructive proposals of the non-aligned states, the New Delhi Declaration and other proposals of the six states of four continents as well as of the Palme Commission have played a positive part in the struggle for reducing tensions and for improvement of international relations. At the same time the present-day international situation is calling for further vigorous efforts by states and peoples, for concrete measures in all spheres of international relations for building a truly positive peace based on a reliable comprehensive system of international security rather than on the mere absence of wars.

The United Nations true to the purposes and principles of its charter must, in our view, take this challenge of our times and work out a fundamental document which would spell out the basic principles of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security and would serve as guidelines in its practical activities in providing material, political, legal, moral and psychological guarantees for that system. That would be consistent with the need for a stronger U.N. role in the maintenance of peace and security, in furthering cooperation among all states, and in promoting principles and norms of international laws. All appropriate considerations and proposals of representatives of states and peoples must be taken into account in the process.

The consideration by the General Assembly at its Forty-First Session of the question of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security and the adoption of an appropriate decision would be a concrete step in this direction and would be fully in line with the task of marking 1986 -- the international year of peace -- with a turn to a better and safer world. At the same time it would add a new perspective to the efforts by all states to ensure peace and international security, to completely eradicate wars from the life of mankind, to establish a new international economic order and to overcome underdevelopment, to promote economic and social development of all peoples. Please regard, Mr Secretary-General, this letter as an explanatory note envisaged by the rules of procedure of the U.N. General Assembly and circulate it as well as the draft resolution attached as an official document of the U.N. General Assembly.

Supplement

Draft Resolution

Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Security

The General Assembly, deeply concerned over the tense and dangerous situation in the world, the danger of sliding down the path of confrontation and the arms race towards the abyss of nuclear self-destruction of humanity, conscious of the urgent need for strengthening the foundations of universal security, on the basis of the U.N. Charter and compliance with the generally recognised norms and principles of international law, conscious of the growing interdependence of countries and the fact that today's world has no reasonable alternative to the policy of cooperation and interaction among states pursued on the basis of equality with unconditional respect for the right of each people to make its sovereign choice of the ways and forms of its development,

reaffirming the important role of the United Nations as an irreplaceable forum for holding talks and achieving agreements on the measures to strengthen international peace, security and cooperation and to democratise international relations, having discussed the question of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, calls upon states to focus their efforts on ensuring equal security for all and in all spheres of international relations and for these purposes to make their contribution to the elaboration of the document containing basic principles of a comprehensive system of international security. Decides to continue the discussion of this question at its forty-second Session.

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CSO: 5200/1514

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET BROADCAST TO CHINA ON BILATERAL ARMS TALKS

OW280528 Moscow in Mandarin to China 0700 GMT 26 Jul 86

[Station Observer Mulatov Commentary: "Expand Cooperation for Socialist Interests"]

[Text] Listeners, as you probably already know, Soviet-Chinese discussions on space weapons, disarmament, and other related issues were held in Beijing recently. From these frank and sincere discussions to seek truth from facts, both sides gained better understanding of each other's views and positions. In this regard, let us hear a commentary by our station observer Mulatov entitled: Expand Cooperation for Peace and Socialist Interests.

Dear Chinese listeners: The development of events has proven the great potential and possibilities to carry out cooperation and concerted action in various spheres between our two socialist countries. As pointed out by Comrade Gorbachev in his political report at the 27th CPSU Congress, the potential is tremendous because this kind of cooperation is in line with the interests of our two countries, and also because to the people of our two countries, socialism and peace are inseparable.

The Chinese trade and economic exhibition that opened in Moscow on 25 July is a striking example of the fruitful development of Soviet-Chinese cooperation in trade and in economic, scientific, and technological fields. As you already know, a Soviet trade and economic exhibition will be held in Beijing at the end of this year. You also know that not only is there a tremendous potential for Soviet-Chinese cooperation in economic, scientific, technological, and cultural fields, but also there are rich experiences shared by our two countries in the closest political cooperation including our effective cooperation to strengthen Asian and world peace, our joint efforts and action to oppose U.S. aggression against Korea in the 1950's, and the important contributions made by both of our countries in convening the Geneva conference on Indochina in 1954. We can also find identical points of view in the proposals for disarmament made by both of our countries in the past.

Today while the world is faced with the threat of a nuclear holocaust, and while the imperialist bloc is ready to shift the focus of the arms race to space, the coordinated actions between our two socialist nations on the international stage is of particular importance. Both of our countries are engaged in large-scale economic construction. We both are loyal to the policy of peaceful coexistence among nations of different social systems, which is the only feasible policy.

The imperialists' policy of strength, the Washington authorities' hostile policy toward the socialist world, their strategy of nuclear blackmail, and the ambition of bellicose imperialist elements to send weapons into space all pose a threat to the future of the world. RENMIN RIBAO pointed out not long ago: Washington's antagonistic policy is manifested in its Star Wars program, its escalation of the arms race in both conventional and nuclear weapons, its intensified interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and its incitement of new sources of conflict.

Dear Chinese listeners: What is particularly important is that the Soviet-Chinese talks to prevent the expansion of the arms race into space and other issues related to disarmament can help both of our countries better understand each other's stand. In other words, these talks are intended to gain further understanding of the basic issues of our time between our two countries.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA: LIVERMORE SCIENTISTS TRY TO DEBUNK 'NUCLEAR WINTER' THEORY

PM080848 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Sukhoy: "Will It Be Merely...Cool?"]

[Text] New York--Since the publication in the 1983 December issue of the magazine SCIENCE of an article on the effect of the "nuclear winter" the U.S. military department has expended a great deal of effort and dollars in an attempt to "refute" the scientists' data. I will remind you that the facts cited in the article by five well-known scientific-experts--C. Sagan, (R. Tarko), (O. Tun), (T. Akerman), and (Dzh. Pollak)--were deadly: In the event of a nuclear war the smoke, fumes, and dust from conflagrations all over the place would rise high into the atmosphere, obscure the sun, and plunge the planet into cold and lifeless darkness.

The staff of the Livermore Scientific Research Laboratory (California) came to the Pentagon's aid. In spring 1985 scientists from Livermore already had the opportunity to talk about how to protect oneself against a nuclear attack. In a report prepared at the request of the government they said, quite unabashedly, that it was a piece of cake--just jump into the nearest reservoir.

Now, it is true, the men from Livermore are not so hasty. They have generally tried to find a solid basis for their conclusions. Colleagues from the nuclear laboratory in Los Alamos (New Mexico) and the national center for atmospheric research were invited to collaborate. For over 2 years they pored over their calculations. Eventually it was all finished. The scientists' toil was over and THE NEW YORK TIMES published the work immediately.

The new theory is that "'nuclear winter' should not occur because the temperature will not fall 45° below normal, as the article in SCIENCE said, but only 25°." Anyway, the study says, it is better to start a war in the summer--the drop in temperature would be less noticeable then. "The temperature would not be so low that people would feel defenseless in their shelters," one of the leaders of the research (common sense prevents one from calling it scientific--V. Sukhoy), (M. Makkreken) from Livermore, says. "The cold would have a harmful effect on the harvest, but it would by no means destroy the Earth's natural ecosystem... it would simply be cool, something like the United States in the fall."

Is that all? What about the irreversible changes in the climate and the environment, the disruption of the water supply, the reduction in the ozone content and the rise in the level of ultraviolet radiation and radioactive fallout? Now a word about them.

"Most of the world will be turned into a block of ice before people begin to sound the alarm about what is happening around them." (R. Tarko), one of the authors of the SCIENCE article says. "As far as I am concerned this would be madness. A nuclear strike is suicide. By its very essence."

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S ZAGLADIN ON CSCE, MORATORIUM, EAST-WEST RELATIONS

LD012144 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 1 Aug 86

[Interview with Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by station editor Bohumil Horak, in Prague; date not given -- recorded in Russian fading into Czech translation]

[Text] [Horak] We are currently marking the 11th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE. Comrade Zagladin, would you briefly assess the previous period and tell us where, in your view, are reserves in regard to relaxation?

[Zagladin] The Helsinki Conference was an exceptional phenomenon in the history of international relations. Before it there had already been a number of meetings, which could be described as East-West meetings, but the meeting in Helsinki was the first time that a whole range of issues concerning security and cooperation was discussed; at the same time these two issues were discussed in their mutual relationship. A document was also adopted, consolidating principles governing mutual relations in new conditions, in the conditions of the balance of forces created. Perhaps one could also say this: While in the disarmament field the SALT I and SALT II treaties and the antimissile defense agreement were the first approach to new thinking, in the area of mutual relations between the East and the West, Helsinki was the first such step in the area of security and cooperation. It is surely not by accident that the 10 main Helsinki principles became a part of the Soviet Constitution.

The results of the Helsinki Conference have nevertheless been subjected to serious tests. A new confrontation, far sharper than any of the previous ones, has caused serious problems to the Helsinki process and impeded the realization of its principles. Nonetheless, the important thing is that despite these storms on the international arena the Helsinki principles have survived and passed the test. It has been shown that the Helsinki roots are very firm, above all in Europe, and on the contrary we see how all European countries are activating their relations and expanding cooperation at various levels. A phenomenon that did not previously exist is emerging. Relations are developing between governments, between political forces regardless of whether or not they are in power. It could be said that autonomous relations have been created between the business circles of the East and the West, and that cultural exchanges are also developing to a considerable extent. Czechoslovakia, is playing a very active role in this. And as was confirmed at the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, the socialist countries want to go even further -- to give the results of the Helsinki Conference new content, new initiatives and actions -- each country in accordance with its specific needs and possibilities. It is also very important that, in fact, the Helsinki experiences have already been studied very carefully for a long time in other areas of the world in an endeavor to come closer to the ideals of security and cooperation as set by the Helsinki Final Act.

[Horak] The period of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, which the Soviet side has extended twice, will expire on 6 August. Such magnanimity is unprecedented in international relations. However, nothing indicates that the United States wants to follow this Soviet step. Will such a negative reaction not have a negative impact on the prospects of all ongoing important talks?

[Zagladin] It certainly will have a negative influence. But one has to weigh some questions more deeply. The United States has not yet expressed itself. I would like this phrase not yet to signify a certain possibility of perspectives.

Moreover, one needs to understand another thing. Our moratorium, which has been a reflection of the political will and political resolve to take a decisive step forward in the field of disarmament, is being received everywhere as an endeavor to tackle the most burning problem of our time: the problem of mankind's survival. In the course of the moratorium there have occurred very deep changes in the world, in public opinion, and this not merely among the public that tends to support the opposition but the public as a whole. The slogan of moratorium has become a generally acknowledged slogan not merely of the socialist countries but also the nonaligned and even of countries that do not belong to either of these two groups. Even a number of Washington's allies, NATO members, speak in favor of a moratorium. The fact that this process has also affected the United States itself to a broad extent is very significant. Only for this reason was it possible for U.S. scientists and our scientists to recently agree on specific monitoring work regarding nuclear tests. This is of immense importance in view of the fact that the monitoring issue has always been an obstacle on the road to disarmament, and it is being shown that given goodwill monitoring is quite realistic. Leading scientists from both countries are now demonstrating in practice that monitoring is completely reliable, even when national devices alone are applied. And what if monitoring were to be carried out on the basis of international cooperation? In brief, considerable shifts are taking place in the issues concerning nuclear tests in the United States itself. For instance, the course of the Geneva talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the problem of nuclear tests -- where a certain progress, albeit a very small one but nonetheless a progress, has been made -- testifies clearly to this. Let us hope that something will be achieved here.

[Horak] What are the prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations in the period ahead? Is their recent activation a mark of a more fundamental change in international relations?

[Zagladin] Indeed, an activation in our relations with the United States has been occurring now but not a change. Activation is occurring in an important but nonetheless secondary direction, in the field of economic relations, cultural exchanges and in consular relations in which we have recorded certain progress. At least in this respect the U.S. side is manifesting certain readiness to go forward, although not completely and not all the way. However, it has not yet manifested such readiness in fundamental issues. It will be necessary to have a look at the new proposals or new ideas contained in President Reagan's reply to Mikhail Gorbachev and which, as Mikhail Gorbachev said in Vladivostok, we are studying carefully.

Our stand is as follows: We want to go forward not only in the secondary issues but simultaneously. Above all we desire a fundamental change in the Soviet-U.S. relations as a whole. We consistently hold the view that strengthening security is possible today only with the full and all-round regard for the legitimate interests of all the participating parties. If the United States took the same approach to these issues, the situation would be different. As Mikhail Gorbachev said in Vladivostok, it is necessary to have a partnership of reason. This is a very correct idea. Nonetheless, the question remains whether there is enough reason and how powerful it is. I would nonetheless like to believe in the strength of reason.

RELATED ISSUES

RSA'S BISHOP TUTU ARRIVES FOR HIROSHIMA SUMMIT

OW021227 Tokyo KYODO in English 1153 GMT 2 Aug 86

[Text] Narita, Chiba Pref, 2 Aug (KYODO)--Bishop Desmond Tutu, who arrived at Narita airport Saturday evening for a "peace summit" in Hiroshima, said Japan as a major industrial country has a very important contribution to make in solving the issue of peace and justice in South Africa.

Tutu, the Anglican bishop of Johannesburg and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, said he intends to tell the Hiroshima meeting that it is "not possible to have peace without justice, as we have seen in South Africa."

The bishop, who was accompanied by his wife Leah, has been invited by the city authorities in Hiroshima to participate in the meeting on August 6 -- the 41st anniversary of the atomic bomb attack on the city -- which marks the International Year of Peace. He likened the state of emergency imposed in South Africa on June 12 to an aspirin which gives temporary respite from toothache. "When the effects wear off, you still have the toothache."

Tutu said the announcement by Pretoria Friday of a crackdown on 1.3 million foreigners working illegally in South Africa was an example of how "unreliable and unstable" the region will be as long as there is injustice and the system of apartheid, or racial segregation. "South Africa knows that it can hold to ransom the neighbouring countries and thereby stop the world from acting decisively on critical issues," he said.

Tutu and his wife will stay in Japan for about a week before traveling to Beijing at the invitation of the Christian Council of Churches in China.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

LONDON INSTITUTE TO MEET IN KYOTO--Tokyo, Aug 8 KYODO--The 28th general meeting of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) will be held September 8-11 in Kyoto, the first such meeting outside North America and Europe, a Foreign Ministry official said Friday. More than 300 academics and researchers involved in security studies from 35 countries, including former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Masataka Kosaka, professor of Kyoto University, will participate in the meeting, the official said. Experts from China and South Korea will also take part in the meeting, which will discuss security in East Asia and the Western bloc, the official said. Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari will deliver a welcoming address, he said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0709 GMT 8 Aug 86 OW] /6662

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